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CONCLUSION

ABSTRACT
This thesis concentrates on the question of whether or not voluntary, treatment
incapable patients who have had their treatment consented to by a substitute
decision-maker can be involuntarily treated. It is my opinion that under the current
legislative scheme in Ontario the restraint of a voluntary, treatment incapable
patient for the purposes of treatment is illegal subject to the following exceptions:
a)

a guardianship order exists that contains authority to restrain and
detain; or

b)

a Power of Attorney for Persona1 Care has been executed by the now
treatment incapable individual authorizing his substitute decisionmaker to have him detained and restrained for the purposes of
treatment.

While some have suggested legislative reform to alleviate the possibility of this
situation o c c h g , 1 do not endorse this suggestion. Instead, the use of advance
directives should be encouraged, as well as the education of the penon with the
mental illness, famiiy members, fkiends, health care providers, the legal
community and membea of the Consent and Capacity Board regarding the powers
and 1imitations of the current legislative scheme.

ABBREVIATIONS
POAPC

power o f attorney for personal care

SDM

substitute decision-maker
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INTRODUCTION
In the mid 19" century, the law in Ontario permitted the detention of persons in
asylums on the basis that they were deemed to be "lunatics." Once admitted to an
asylum, treatment was given. In general, in the Ontario of years past, once
diagnosed as a person with mental illness, treatment was automatically
administered. Such "treatment" often consisted of extremely invasive procedures
that are considered today as acts of abuse.'

Over time, however, it was acknowledged that the state required more justification
to deny the fkeedom of persons with mental illnesses. This resulted in a narrowing

of the cornmitment c rite ria.^ In addition, the mere fact that one was a patient in a
psychiatnc facility, or even an involuntary patient, no longer automatically
authorized the imposition of treatment-consent was required.'
Incremental changes have included increased procedural protections4 and the
acknowledgment that competent patients have the right to make decisions
'For examples such as surgical interventions, forced emetics, and depatterning,
see Chapter 1.

2Thecriteria was narrowed in the -ta1

H o u s Act, S.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 20.

See p. 8.

'See Chapter 2, pages 80-83.

40ntarioinstituted review boards in the MentalAct. 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 51
and patient's rights advice with the introduction of the Psychiatrie Patient Advocate's
Office in 1982.

regarding treatment, including the refusal of treatment? Legislation was also
introduced to put in place a system whereby a substitute decision-maker may be
authorized to consent to treatment on behalf of an incapable person6

From grave abuses of the past, the approach towards the mentally il1 has swung
like a pendulum to a sharp focus on the "nghts" of persons with mental illnesses.
Many groups and individuals have expressed dissatisfaction with the current

Ontario legislation, stating it is too liberal, preventing the detention and treatment
of persons with mental illnesses, with debirnental consequences to the patient and

increased danger to society.' In particular, many people feel that hospitals are
prohibited fiom forcing treatment on voluntary patients who are incapable of
making treatment decisions even when substitute decision-makers believe
treatrnent to be in the best interest of the patient. They propose that the current

'~imothyAppelby and Ji11 Mahoney, "Fear Underground: Coping with Subway
Shovings" The Globe and (7 February 1998) A l ;Michael Valpy, "Mental Illness:
Cleaning out the Cuckoo's Nest" The Globe and
(7 March 1998) D 1;David Frum,
"Report on Mentally Il1 Lacks Recommendations" The London Free Press (1 3 June
1998); Jim Moms, "Take Mentally Ill off Street, Jury Urges" n e Globe and
(26
November 1997) A12; Rory Leishman, "Cease Abandonhg Mentally Ill" Jke London
Free Press (4 May 1998) C 1.
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legislative scheme in Ontario does not permit forced treatment of al1 vol~ntary,~
treatment incapable9 patients who refuses to take medication orally, or to comply
with procedures such as electroconvulsive therapy, even when the appropriate

substitute decision-maker has provided consent." They believe this to be
evidence of a system of legislation in need of reform.

In this thesis 1will center on the questions of whether:
a)

b)

the forced treatrnent of voluntary,treatment incapable patients
is prohibited under Ontario law; and, if so,
whether it should be.

1 will first present a review of the history of cornmitment and treatment of persons
with mental illnesses in Ontario since the 19" century. The medical procedures

andor medications employed by psychiatrists during this period will also be
highlighted. Such a review serves as a cautionary backdrop against which current
approaches to the care of persons with mental illness should be assessed.

1 will then provide a thorough review of the current Ontario law. In Chapter 2,1

k'~oluntary"means essentially that the person must be discharged on hîs or her
request. See Chapter 2, p. 36-38.
'A person is txeatrnent incapable if he or she cannot understand or appreciate the
consequences of giving or refusing consent. See Chapter 2, p. 67-68.

1°See Chapter 2, p. 92.
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outline the mental health legislation in Ontario regarding hospitalization and
treatment that is contained in the Meml He&
Act. 1992,'' and the &&b

Care Co-

..

AC&'' the Substitute Decisions

Act. 1996.13 Through this Chapter 1 will

demonstrate that, under Ontario law, health care providers are prevented f?om
forcing treatrnent on voluntary patients who are not capable of making treatment
decisions.l4

In Chapter 3, 1 will present ethical and policy considerations in relation to the
current Ontario law. Particularly, what are the arguments for and against the
involuntary treatment of voluntary, treatment incapable patients who refuse to
comply with treatment that has been consented to by their substitute decisionmaker? M i l e there are compelling arguments on both sides 1 believe that a
contextual review will demonstrate such treatment cannot be justified.

Finally, despite recognizing that the current legislative scheme is not without

"R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7.

"With the exception that some voluntary, treatment incapable patients may be
involuntarily treated when appropriate authority is in place through a guardianship order,
or Power of Attorney for Persona1 Care. These exceptions will be M e r expanded in
Chapter 2.
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shortcomings, in Chapter 4 1 will argue that the legislation should not be
reformed. 1 will review and dismiss suggestions to broaden the cornmitment
criteria, to increase power to the substitute decision-maker, andor to mandate that
al1 voluntary patients be competent to consent to treatment and admission. 1 will
also dismiss suggestions that application could be made to the court under its
p a r a s patriae jurisdiction. 1 will then review and accept suggestions to encourage
the use of advance directives, and to educate health care providen, family and
fkiends, the legal community, and members of the Consent and Capacity Board
regarding the cument legislative scheme that attempts to balance competing
societal and individual rights.

CHAPTER 1-HISTORY

I n troductieg
In this chapter, 1 will briefly review the historical treatment of the mentally il1 in
Ontario over the past two centuries. This review will focus on the law regarding
commitrnent, the law regarding consent to treatment, and practice (as illuminated
by descriptions of procedures used in the treatment of mental illness).

1 believe that it is instructive to review this history of persons with mental illnesses

in Ontario to provide a backdrop against which any proposed changes to the
current legislation can be reviewed. Such a review will be instructive regarding the

nature of the legislation, and it will also provide insight into the nature of
discrimination that persons with mental illnesses have faced in the past. Any
consideration of changes to the current legislation must ensure that similar
injustices will not be repeated.

1.
-

ewew of the b w R
O

. w Co-

O

The treatment of those persons with mental illnesses in Ontario during the late 19"

and early 20" century was similar to that in England and the United States. The

rich mentally il1 were cared for at home or discreetly placed in private asylums in

7

order to protect the reputation of the family."

The poor mentally il1 often became

the responsibility of the comrnunity: a local family was often paid to care for such

individuals, but if the cost became prohibitive, the person was often driven nom
the cornmunity. Many eventually became residents of the "poor house". However,

because of problems with overcrowding, the mentally il1 began to be placed apart

fkom the poor in asylums under the

As-

Act. 1817.16 In order to

prevent overcrowding and taxing the public purse, rules were established regarding
who could be granted admission: thus, the issue of committal arose.

The law regarding comrnittal of persons with mental illnesses has centered around
two major issues: fmt, the basis for committal, and second, the power to commit.
Persons were comrnitted to asylums simply because they had been diagnosed as
"iunatics". An Act Respecthg Asvlums for the I n s m , 1870-7 1," authorized the
involuntary detention of a person by way of a medicaf certificate signed by three

" ~ a r r e nThomas Reich, ed. Mcylopedia of R i o e w (revised edition) (Toronto:
Simon and Schuster and Prentice Hall International, 1995) at 1927-28.
16MichaelBay, "The Ontario Mental Health Act" (1997) 17:4 Health Law in
Canada 124. Bay relates that the reason the mentally ili were separated fiom the poor was
that they began to fil1 the poor houses. As a control measure, the admission to the new
asylums required an order of the justice of the peace.

physicians. The Act provided that :
6. Such certificate shall state that the inspecting medical
practitioners at the same time, and in the presence of each other,
exarnined the patient, and afier due enquiry into al1 necessary facts
relating to his case, found him to be a lunatic.
7. Such certificate shall be sufficient authority to any person to
convey the lunatic to any of the said Asylums, and to the authonties
thereof to detain him therein so long as he continues to be insane."
Involuntary committal as a result of being diagnosed as a "lunatic" continued until
1950, when the legislation was revised such that, to be admitted into a psychiatrie

facility, a person had to have a mental illness and "...requires care, supervision and
control for his own protection or welfare, or for the protection of others."lg

By 1877 the Ontario statute regarding "Lunatic Asylums and the Custody of Insane
~ersons"'~
provided two routes of admission to an asylum. The highlights of each
avenue are as follows:

"S.O. 1870-71,c. 18,ss. 6 and 7.
Act, S.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 20 (2) (m).It should be noted that
the legislation fiom the 1870s to the 1950s changed litde in substance regarding
admission to an asylum and the route by which admission was granted.
20

1877, c. 220.

Custodv of Insane Pers-

R.S.O.

I

Route 1-Medical Certifîcate

Route 2-Lieutenant Governor's

-required signature of 3 doctors2'
-critenon for admission: person was a
lunatic2'
-superintendent had to approve both
the admission and discharge of any
person admitted by way of a medical
certif i ~ a t e ~ ~

As-

-information given to a Justice of the
Peace that indicated the person was
"...insane and dangerous to be at
large..."24
-the Justice of the Peace could issue a
warrant to have the person conducted
to jails
-the jail surgeon and another doctor
could issue a medical certificateZ6
-a county Judge would also have to
issue an order of committa12'
-al1 above subject to the approval of
the Department of the Provincial
secret+'
-once approved, a warrant was issued
to conduct the person fiom the jail to
the a ~ y l u r n ~ ~

and the Custodv of Insane Persons, R.S.O.

1877, c. 220, S. 8.

291bidtNote: for additional explanation regarding the provisions of this Act, see
S.E.D. Shortt, -cv
-d
M. Bucke
Practice of Late Nineteenth,
Centurv Psvchiatrv) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 5 1.

By 1 9 3 ~ the
~ ' power to commit was placed entuely within the domain of

physicians: no aspect required the approval of a member of the judiciary."

The revised process of committai was criticized as offering few protections to
those persons wrongfully detained. In 1938 after a lawyer acquaintance of Premier

Mitchell Hepburn complained to him that he had been irnprisoned at London

Psychiatric Hospital for three years, despite the fact that he alleged he had not been
s u f f e ~ g&om a mental disorder, an inquiry was e s t a b 1 i ~ h e d .series
j ~ ~ of

recommendations, including the introduction of regular boards of review to
monitor patients' detentions, was made.33 Few of the recomrnendations were
Act. 1935, S.O. 1935, c. 39. The precise reasons for the
change to the commitment procedures is not entirely clear to me as a person who is not a
historian, but the 1930s were a time of much change surrounding mental health in
Ontario. These changes included:
an increased push for out patient treatment centres. In 1930131 the
a)
Department of Health opened six clinics in Ontario but these were soon
abandoned as unworkable (e.g. much of the staffs time was spent
administering I.Q. tests to single rnothers because a popular belief of the
day equated motherhood outside of marriage to mental retardation);
the introduction of Approved Boarding Homes ( in 193 3);
b)
reform
on the commitment procedures; and
C)
the belief that mental iilness was a disease just like other medical illnesses
d)
and therefore, subject to cure. Many new treatments, developed in Europe,
encouraged psychiatrists to push for changes to legitimize their profession.
. .
See Harvey G. Simmons, m e d : M a H u Pol~cyin Ontario 1930-1989
(Toronto Wall and Thompson, 1990) at ix and 47-49.
"Bay, ylpfa note 16 at 124.
"Simmons, s y ~ note
~ n 30 at 9.
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implemented: indeed it was not until 1967 that review boards were established in
Ontario.

Criticisms of the Mental He-t

in Ontario continued. In the mid 1960s, a

farmer on the Bruce Peninsula drove a tax collector off his property with a

s h o t g ~ n . )The
~ man was comrnitted to the Penetanguishene Mental Hospital but
hired a lawyer and spoke in the press of his treatment." After an application was
made for habeas corpus, a judge appointed a board to review the ~ituation.'~
Although the board never met because the farmer was discharged the day prior to
the meeting, the episode led to the passage of Ontario's first Mental H e m AC[.)'

The Mental Health Act. 1967 statutorily provided for review boards3*and more

"Bay,

note 16 at 124.

"LbiQ It should be noted that Ontario did have a previous Act entitled the
"Mental Hedth Acf' (S.O. 1954, c. 50). That Act was purely an administrative directive
as set out in S. 2 for the Minister and department officiais to "...promote and encourage
the establishment and CO-ordinationof facilities for the accumulation and dissemination
of information relating to mental health, and advise and assist local boards, medical
officers of health, public hospitals and other persons and institutions in ail matters
pertaining to mental health."

stringent cnteria for involuntary commitment than had been in place in the past.19
S. 8 of the Act incorporated a dangerousness-oriented criterion:
8.--(1) Any person who,
(a) suffers fkom mental disorder of a nature or degree
so as to require hospitalization in the interests of his

own safety or the safety of others; and

(b) is not suitable for admission as an informa1 patient,
may be admitted as an involuntary patient to a psychiatric
facility upon application therefore in the prescribed fom
signed by a phy~ician.~'
The Mental Health Act has been arnended in 1978, 1986, 1987, 1992 and 1996
(with the creation of the &&h

Care Consent Act. 199641).4'These amended Acts

reflect the continued focus on the need for procedural protections for persons with

39MedHealthAct. 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 51, S. 8. See also Bay, ~ur>rainote 16 at
124.

'% should be noted that the number of physicians required to commit a person to
a psychiacric facility has decreased steadily throughout the years. For example, the
Provincial Luliptic A s a Act, S.O. 1853 (16 V.) c. 188, s. 7; ,4n Act -CU
Asvlums for the Insane, S.O. 1870-71, c. 18, S. 5; and An Act-eR
A
!
+
, Cwtodv of 1-e
Persofl~,R.S.O. 1877, c. 220, s. 8, al1 required the
signature of 3 physicians for comrnittal. By 1887, however, only 2 physicians were
required to provide certificates for committal: see A
n L-ic Asand the Custodv of ,R.S.O. 1887, c. 245, S. 7; M
s for the InAct, R.S.O. 1914, c. 295, S. 7; and the M e n a Hosi>itals Act, S.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 20 (1).
The Mental Hwlth Act. 1967. S.O. 1967, c. SI, S. 8 (1) required only one physician to
complete a certificate that resulted in involuntary commitment and t h i s requirement
continues today; see the M e n m t h Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 1.
"S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A.
note 16 at 1%. The curent state of the law, as outlined in the 1996
"Bay,
arnendrnents, will be discussed more Mly in Chapter 2.
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mental illnesses, as well as the conflict between balancing the rights of such
persons with the duty to provide tare.“)

ILL

view of theLaw Re-

.

Consent to TreatmplLt

Persons with mental illnesses were often deemed to have no ability to make
decisions of any kind for themselves: the mere presence of mental illness
correlated to a finding of incapacity to make any decisions. As Dr. C. A. Roberts

explained:
It didn't occur to me with a certified patient, any more than with a
prisoner, that there was any question of asking them whether or not
they wanted treatment. They had been brought to hospital mentally
ill, incapable of judgment or decision, so they were treated. That
was tme of mental hospitals, prisons, homes for the aged, and county
homes. Forrnalized consents were a postwar devel~pment.~

Since it did not occur to many physicians that persons with mental illness could
make decisions regarding their care, who provided consent? In keeping with the

belief that the physician knew best what was appropriate for his or her patients,
traditionally, the superintendent of the provincial psychiatric hospitals assumed
much of the decision-making capacity for al1 the patients in the institution:
The superintendent ruled supreme within the hospital, the patients
were his subjects and however kindly an individual superintendent
4 3 ~ hconflict
e
between liberty and beneficence will be discussed more fûily in
Chapter 3.
41~imrnons,

note 30 at 225.

rnight feel toward these subjects they were, ultirnately at his mercy
and the mercy of the hospital staff. By claiming they were acting in
the patients' best interests, psychiatrists could solemnly invoke
intrusive and cruel treatments without anyone raising an eyebrow?
The loss of control over one's body and other rights by virtue of being an

involuntarily hospitalized peaon, diagnosed with a mental illness, was extensive.
As Simmons points out:

Once in hospital the patient was v h a l l y a prisoner, with the
superintendent granted "full control over the custody and care of the
person of every patient" in the institution. This rneant that patients
could be forcibly subjected to an array of drastic treatrnents such as
insulin coma therapy, metrazol, electroshock, wet packs and even, as
we have seen, psychosurgery. Patients could lose control of their
property, they were stripped of their right to vote in provincial and
federal elections, barred nom practicing as fimeral directors, police
officers, accountants, medical doctors, pharmacists and they could be
deported from the province or even canada?
When some persons in the system began questioning the propriety of treating
patients without any consent per se, many superintendents asked the Department of
Health to require relatives to provide the supenntendents with "blanket consent for

any treatment which may, in our judgrnent, be of benefit to the ~atient."~'Other
superintendents asked permission of the Department of Health to send out consent
forms to relatives of those patients who they wished to provide with various

45Simmons,

j6M.at 226.
471bid.at 25.

note 30 at 23.
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treatments. The Department, and some psychiatrists, were not in favour of such a
practice: "When any patient cornes to us for psychiatric treatment we should not be
interfered with in giving adequate treatment by the withholding of consent by
relative~."~~

There was no explicit reference to the treatment (voluntary or involuntary) of

patients in psychiatric facilities in the statutes of Ontario until the Mental Hospitals
qEt, 1 9 3 5 . ~S.~ 15 stated:

Except as provided by this Act, the superintendent of an institution
shall have full control over and the custody and care of the person of
every patient in the institution and every patient shall be maintained,
cared for, ma,
released and discharged therefrom only as may
be provided by this Act and the regulations. [emphasis added]
Over time there were some transitions in the law regarding treatment, but the
approach remained the same. The -0mpetencv
conjunction with the Men-

Act, 1960'' applied in

Act regarding the care of persons who were

incapable to consent to treatment. The M
ent-cv

Act stated:

2.--(1) Subject to The Mental HospifalsAct, the court
has al1 the powers, jurisdiction and authority of Her Majesty
over and in relation to the persons and estates of mentally

48~imrnons,

note 30 at 23, quoting Dr. Stevenson.

49~.0.
1935, c. 39.
50~.~
1960,
. 0c.. 237.

incompetent persons, including the care and the commitrnent
of the custody of mentally incompetent persons and of their
persons and estates.

(2) The court may make orders for the custody of mentally
incompetent persons and the management of their estates,
and every such order takes effect, as to the custody of the
person, imrnediately and, as to the custody of the estate, upon
the completion of the cornmittee's security. R.S.O. 1950,
c. 230, S. 2."
When physicians became aware of the need for some type of authority or consent
to treat individuals, many believed that the Public Hospitals ACP
and its 1952

regulations provided that authority." However, as H o h a n points out:
[n]ot only was the defmition of competency lacking but also there
was not legal coverage at al1 for treatrnent in the community or for

',-lncomwtenfv~ct,

R.S.O. 1960, c. 237, S. 2 (1) and (2).

53BrianF. Hofhan,
to T r e n t in On(Toronto:
Buttenvorihs, 1995) at 105 and Ontario, "Enquiry on Mental Competency: Final Report"
(Chairman David N. Weisstub) (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1990) at 308. 0. Reg. 216/52,
S. 43 stated:
No surgical operation shall be perfonned on a patient unless a consent in
writing for the performance of the operation has k e n signed by the
(a)
patient,
spouse, one of the next of kin or parent of the patient if the patient
(b)
is unable to by reason of mental or physical disability, or
parent or guardian of the patient if the patient is unmamed and
(c)
under 18 years of age
but if the surgeon believes that delay caused by obtaining consent would
endanger the life of the patient
the consent shali not be necessary, and
(d)
the surgeon shall write and sign a statement that a delay would
(e)
endanger the life of the patient.

decisions about other areas of persona1 care; thus, in these laws,
standards of competency or capacity assessments, guide-lines for
substitute decisions, hierarchy of decision makers, rights or review
and legal appeal were generally lacking."

The Menal Ho*

AC^' of 1950 set out the powen of the superintendent of a

psychiatric facility to inciude the
full control over, and the custody and care of the person of every
pr:icnt in the institution and every patient shall be maintained, cared
for, treated in, released and discharged therefiom only as may be
provided by this Act and the reg~lations.~~
However, the Mental Act. 1967~'spoke in more restrictive terrns and

separated the areas of involuntary cornmitment from the need for treatment.''

.

The criterion for involuntary cornmitta1 was narrowed to the dangerousness
standards9and there was no mention of "control over" or treatment as there was in
the 1950 legislation. The change in legislation did not, however, result in a
change in the practice of al1 psychiatrists treating patients without c ~ n s e n t . ~

"Hoffman,

note 53 at 105.

5 5 ~ .1950,
0 . c. 229.

'%.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 14.
"S.O. 1967, c. 51.

58~ofsnan,

note 53 at 106.

60

note 30 at 228-30.

Simmons,
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With the increased movement to patient's rights that began in the 1960s and 1970s,

the potential for persons with mental illness to have their civil rights violated was
highlighted.6' The increased focus on rights in general resulted in incremental
legislative acknowledgments of the rights of persons with mental illnesses to make
decisions regarding accepting or refiising treatment. By 1980 the Ontario Mental
Health

AC^^' acknowledged that capable patients had a right to refuse treatrned3

and provided a mechanism for a person to appoint a substitute decision-maker to

~ Act, however,
act on her competent wishes in the event of füture u i ~ a p a c i t y .The

also empowered a Review Board to override the wishes of an involuntary,
treatment incapable patient who had made prior wishes while capable?

6'The Canadian Civil Liberties Association cornmissioned two lawyers to review a
sarnple of 200 involuntary certificates in the mid 1970s- They concluded that
approximately "80% of the commitments were legally insufficient, lacking completeness,
adequacy and noncircularity of evidence". See: Stewart Page "Cornmitment of the
Mentally 111 in Ontario: The Last Two Decades" (1994) l8:3 4 Legal Medical Quarterly 9.

62v
Act, R. S.O. 1980, c. 262.
6 3 M e n t a l ,R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. 35 (2) (a).
" M e n t H e l t h A , R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. lb.
65~er&34-&&
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. 3Sa (4). This section was ruled
unconstitutional in Fie-v.
(1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 74,82 D.L.R. (4") 298 (C.A.)
(hereinafter
which will be discussed fürther in Chapter 2.

u)
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Eedy Proccd~rsUscd to Trmt Persans H a t b M c a t i l s e s

As outlined above, in the years past, patients were involuntarily cornrnitted and

treated without consent in Ontario.However, family members, persons fiom the
general public, and even some professionals began to question the practice of the
day. What was happening to these people? Did they need more protection? In

order to understand why people became so concemed regarding the treatment of
the mentally il1 in Ontario at that time, 1 will now provide a review of some of the

treatments to which persons with mental illness were subjected.

A)

Sustained Sieep

Persons with psychiatric illness, particularly those with psychotic or manic
symptoms, were given dmgs to induce prolonged periods of sleep. Dr. Neil
Macleod, a doctor fiom Scotland, placed a 50 year old woman expenencing
delusions into a bromide-induced sleep that lasted over twelve days? Macleod
treated other patients with prolonged sleep and claimed that, upon awakening, their
illnesses had disappeared."

(%horter, Edward, A b r y of Psv c b (New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.,
1997,) at 202.
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Induced sleep by bromide administration was soon abandoned by other d~ctors,~'
but the use of barbitunites to induce prolonged sleep was introduced. Some
patients died following this p r o ~ e d u r ebut
, ~ ~attempts to discover safer barbiturates
continued. A particulary dark chapter in Canadian medical history surrounded the
use of barbiturate-induced sleep by Dr. D. Ewen Cameron in Montreal.

Dr. Cameron placed persons in a deep sleep and then performed other procedures
upon them.

'O

Although Dr. Cameron died "essentially in disgrace'"' in 1964, he

had been a highly respected member of the psychiatrie cornmunity. He won

several awards and had been a president of the American Psychiatric Association
and the World Psychiatric ~ssociation?

B)

Insulin Coma

The use of "Insulin Coma Therapy" began in Ontario on May 3 1, 1937 at the
Toronto Psychiatric H ~ s p i t a l . ~It~was described by a Department of Health

68

Shorter,
note 66 at 202. This treatment may have k e n abandoned because
of the nsk of bromide toxicity.

69Lbid.at 205. Swiss psychiatrist Max Müeller determined that sleep induced
treatment using the barbiturate Somnifen had a mortaiity rate of approximately 5%.

section on "depatteming" on p. 26.
"Shorter,

note 66 at 207.

"CBC, The Fifth Estate, Jan. 6, 1998.
"Simmons, y l p ~ anote 30 at 16.

OEcial as "...a unique experiment...at present limited to fernale~".~'In the case of
insulin coma therapy, patients were given large doses of insulin, a substance
normally produced in the body in the pancreas to regulate sugars in the body. In
psychiaûic facilities, persons with no physiological indication for treatment with
insulin were given massive dosages of the dmg. Patients were in fact placed in an
insulin coma, a condition that is today avoided at al1 costs in the treatment of
persons with diabetes because of the profound dangers and harm done to the body
by such a state. Afier being placed in an insulin coma, the patients were

subsequently given glucose. Following a series of insulin-induced comas76some

of the patients had periods of lucidity for various durations."

Dr. Peter Breggin,

described his encounter with insulin shock during his training:

75

Simrnons,
note 30 at 16. It is disturbing to note that many of these very
intrusive procedures were performed first, or disproportionally, upon women. In addition
to the example of insulin coma cited above, electro-convuisive therapy was adrninistered
much more frequently to women than to men. For example, in 1964, at Whitby
Psychiatrie Hospital, 2,175 women were given ECT compared to 884 men (see
note 30 at 19/20). It is also disturbing that Dr. R. M. Bucke performed
Simmons,
gynecological surgery on 209 women before abandonhg the practice, while on1y wiring
the foreskins of 15 men before ceasing that "treatment": see page 3 1-32 for more details
regarding Dr. Bucke. Lobotomies were also performed on women far more fiequently
thm on men (see note #105). While a full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of
this thesis, it shouid be noted that the disproportionate numbers of hamiful treatments
inflicted on women is another example of the male-dominated discrimination women
have endured in the past.
'%orne patients were placed in insulin comas approxùnately 20 times, while in
Nova Scotia in 1943, Dr. Charles Roberts increased his patients' insulin dosages over a
penod of L O days that wouid result in a deep coma: See Shorter,
note 66 at 2 12-213.

1 observed the insulin coma room, where rows of patients were

purposely overdosed with insulin, causing a &op in their blood
sugar, until they fell into convulsions and a coma fiom starvation of
the brain. As 1 watched them writhe about on mats, near death, it
seemed like a scene fiom hell. 1 watched them being fed sugar and
orange juice, to awaken into a state of fear and confûsion. The once
difficult and unnily inmates with their brains now pemanently
damaged, became gratefûlly dependent on their keepers after being
brought back from the edge of death. Their righteous physicians
called it an irnprovement and even a cure."

C)

Metrazol Therapy

Metrazol is a camphor-based drug that was used beginning in the 1930s on penons
in psychiatric h~spitals.'~This dmg produced "spine-cracking convulsions""

which some claimed resulted in relief of some psychotic symptoms for some
patients." Metrazol (and its successor Cardiazol) produced convulsions that
resulted in a number of spinal fractures."

In addition, the dnigs did not always

produce the desired convulsions, and resulted in vomiting and muscular discornfort
in the injection site post procedure." Many patients did not want to be injected
78~eter
R. Breggin Toxic Psy&i&y (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991 ) at 6.
79Simmons,

note 30 at 15.

"W.
"Shorter,

note 66 at 2 15-2 16.

82Simrnons,y e ~ note
ô
30 at 19-20.
83

Shorter,

note 66 at 2 16.
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with these drugs because of the severe feelings of dread and anxiety they

expenenced prior to c o n ~ u l s i n g .In~ fact, one psychiatrist responsible for
administering a camphor treatment in England recalled "...the unseemly and tragic
farce of an unwilling patient being pursued by a posse of nurses with me, a fully
loaded syringe in my hand, bringing up the rear."''

The introduction of

electroconvulsive therapy resulted in the termination of camphor treatment~.~~

D)

Laxatives

"Administering laxatives to the mentally il1 on the assumption that toxins bottled

up in the colon were making them insane, reached back to the Middle Ages and
before."" The belief that cleansing the bowel with harsh laxatives could shorten

an episode of mental illness continued until the 1 9 2 0 ~ . ~ *

E)

Forced Emetics

Various drugs that produced violent vomiting were also used to treat persons with
manic symptoms during the middle 19'" cenhiry:
"Shorter,

sucre note 66 at 2 16.

8 6 Eto~be~explained M e r : see page 24.
"Shorter,
"81bid,

note 66 at 196.

...patients who were bothered by mania and could not slow down
were administered this drug [Apomorphine]. They were said to
literally turn green and vomit for up to an hour. This would have a
sapping effect and they would h a l l y be able to get six hours or so of
much needed r e ~ t . ~ ~

F)

Electroconvulsive Therapy

Of al1 the treatments described above, electroconvulsive therapy, or ECT, is the

only one still used in modem day psychiatry, although with much less fiequency,
and with much different administration than in the past. ECT came into favour

after experiments revealed that it was a much safer way to induce seizures than
patients were more
rnetrazol therapy. The risks of spinal fiacture were reducedTgO
receptive to it than metrazol, and it was much cheaper and easier to adrnini~ter.~'

The use of ECT as therapy for mental illness began in 1941 in ~ n t a r i o . ~As
' the

g9Shorter,ylpra note 66 at 196.
Simmons,
note 30 at 19-20. Simrnons dso points out that the initial
indications that ECT produced negligible instances of spinal fractures were dispelled by
1950 when statistics revealed that between 1944 and 1950,12.8% of persons receiving
ECT suffered compression fiactures of the spine.
90

following statistics reveal, it rapidly gained popularity with psychiatrists:
ber of ECT Performed in on tari^

It is unclear, even today, how ECT expressly works to alleviate some symptoms of

mental illness, particularly depression." In the early days of administration in
Ontario it was acknowledged that ECT served to subdue some violent patients and
made caring for them much easier: a reference fkom the Archives of Ontario
revealed that "[slhock therapy also greatly eased the nursing pr~blem".~'Dr. N. L.
Easton, in 1946 advised the director of the hospitals division that he believed ECT
should be used on the wards "...with the purpose of treating chronically disturbed
patients-the nursing problem would be greatly alleviated and the destruction
almost eliminated."%

Electroconvulsive therapy is still performed today, particularly for treatment of

93Simrnons,ylpia note 30 at 19-20.
94Shorter,yllua note 66 at 207-8.
95~immons,
glpgl note 30 at 21.

%Jbid.
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major, irretractable depression. However, its use was sharply curtailed following
the anti-psychiatry movement that began in the 1960s.

G)

bbDepatterning"

Dr. Ewen C a ~ n e r o nthe
, ~ ~renowned psychiatrist who practiced in Montreal,
instituted a procedure he called "depatterning" with the aim of changing the
person's previous b e h a v i o ~ r .To
~ ~achieve this end he placed his patients in
prolonged sleep and then attempted to erase and replace the images in theu minds.
He did this by the use of continuous drug-induced sleep, ECT, and repeated taped

messages. As noted earlier, Dr. Cameron died in 1964, "essentially in d i ~ ~ r a c e . " ~ ~
Subsequently it has been revealed that Dr. Cameron was receiving fünds fiom both
the CIA and the Canadian govemment to conduct these experiments regarding

what we commonly refer to as brainwa~hing.'~~

H)

Psychosurgery

The concept of performing surgery on the brain to alleviate mental illness dates

97

See section on "sustained sleep", p. 19.

"Shorter,
99

note 66 at 207.

See p. 20.

'%e legacy o f Dr. Cameron has been detailed in several different media,
including the CBC Fiflh Estate television show of Jan. 6, 1998.
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back to the Middle Ages when docton "fantasized about cutting for the mythical
'stone of rnadne~s"'.'~'The most famous modem day re-creation of psychosurgery
was portrayed in the film "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest." In this film, the

lead character, refusing to adhere to hospital and societal noms, was

Iobotomized.

Psychosurgery refers to any surgery involving the brain. Lobotomies are
procedures most commonly associated with attempts at psychiatrie treatment.
Pre-fiontal lobotomies were perfomed either by drilling holes in the skull and

inserting an instrument to sever the nerve pathways or by inserting an icepick
through the eye socket and thin bone to reach the fiontal

Surgical

interference with the brain's fiontal lobes has far reaching consequences:

The frontai lobes are the seat of higher human functions, such as
love, concem for others, empathy, self-insight, creativity, initiative,
autonomy, rationality, abstract reasoning, judgrnent, fùture planning,
foresight, willpower, detemination, and concentration. The fiontal
lobes allow us to be 'human' in the full sense of that word; they are
required for a civilized, effective, mature life.'03

Such procedures gained prominence in Ontario in the 1940s. The first lobotomy
'OIShorter,anote 66 at 225.
'O2=

1O3

New Fmcv

Breggin,

Britannic& 1997 ed., SN. "Lobotomy".
note 78 at 53.
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operations were performed in Ontario at the Toronto Psychiatric Hospital in
1944' and were performed disproportionately on women. los in total, "pJetween
1944 and 1967 approximately 1,000 lobotomies were done at various provincial
mental hospitais. An unknown number of operations were perfomed in general
hospitals on patients admitted fiom the community and at the federally run
Westminister Veteran's Hospital in London, Ontario.9,106

In the United States, Dr. Walter Freeman becarne the major promoter of
lobotomies. He claimed to have performed 5,000 ~obotornies'~~
and travelled
throughout the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico, and Curacao providing
demonstrations of the proced~re.'~'His biographer relates that:

[o]n one five-week summer trip that year, [195 11 he drove 11,000
miles with a station wagon loaded, in addition to camping
equipment, with an electroconvulsive shock box, a dictaphone, a file
cabinet filled with patient records, photographs, and correspondence;
1°<~arvey
G. Simmons, "Psychosurgery and the Abuse of Psychiatric Authority in
Ontario" (1987) 12:3 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 537 at 540. Dr. K.G.
McKenzie, a neurosurgeon, perfomed the first operation.

"'~he first 19 lobotomy operations in 1944 were ail performed on women.
In addition, of the 150 lobotomies performed at Toronto General Hospital nom
1948 to 1952, 109 were performed on women, while only 38 were conducted on
men: see Simmons,
note 104 at 540.
'06Lbip.

lo7Breggin,
108

Shorter,

note 78 at 3 1.
note 66 at 227.
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his surgical instruments were in his pocket.Iog
Freeman's use of an unsterilized ice pick has been criticized, as has his technique:

"...he sometimes showed off by stabbing the patient through both eye sockets at
once with an ice pick in each hand.""O Although such practices are unthinkable
today, Dr. Freeman was the Director of Neurology and Psychiatry at George
Washington University in the District of Columbia and had been honoured with
several awards.

'''

The excising of a portion of a person's fiontal lobe was done without any concrete
evidence of benefit to the patient. It was soon acknowledged that the main benefit
of performing lobotomies accrued to the nursing staff and the hospital

administration: "[tlhe leucotomy program at this hospital has till recently been
airned at alleviating the ward management problem with chronic, disturbed
patients. Hence the great majority of our operated series is comprised of such
cases.7'112 The response was similar at another hospital:

Our first thought was to give lobotomies to the chronically

'Ogshorter,

note 66 at 227, citing Elliot Valenstein, Great

Cures, at 229.

"'Breggin,

"*Simmons,

note 78 at 32.

note 104 at 542, quoting Doig, 1957.

Despm

assaultive, destructive and soiling group of patients that more or less
regularly had to be secluded. Our thought was that we probably
might not be able to get too many of these patients out of hospital,
but we would create an easier nursing situation in the h~spital.''~
Not only were the nurses benefitted because of easier ward management, but
psychiatrists were able to achieve sorne of the much desired recognition and
respect accorded to their medical colleagues. By performing lobotomies, a
surgical procedure, to treat mental illness, they were bringing their profession in
line with medical practitioners: there was an "...enthusiastic reception to a medical,
indeed a surgical, procedure which helped to blur the distinction between the

practice of physical and psychiaeic medicine.

991

14

Psychosurgery is not illegal today but is infiequently used in the treatment of
psychiatric illness. The Ontario Mental Hedth Act1l5 States:
49. (1) Psychosurgery.--Psychosurgeryshall not be administered to
an involuntary patient, to a person who is incapable of giving or
refùsing consent to psychosurgery on his or her own behalf for the
purposes of the HeaZlh Core Consent Act, 1996, or to a person who
is remanded or detained in a psychiatric facility punuant to the
Criminal Code (Canada). 1987, c. 37, S. 1 1; 1992, c. 32, S. 20 (39);
1996, c. 2, S. 72 (30).
S.

"3Simmons,
note 104 at 542, quoting the superintendent of the Hamilton
Hospital, December 15, 1958.

(2) Same.--Psychosurgery is any procedure that, by direct or indirect
access to the brain, removes, destroys or intempts the continuity of
histologically normal brain tissue, or that inserts indwelling
electrodes for pulsed electrical stimulation for the purpose of altering
behaviour or treating psychiatrie illness, but does not include
neurological procedures used to diagnose or treat organic brain
conditions, intractable physical pain or epilepsy, if these conditions
are clearly demonstrable. 1987, c. 37, S. 11; 1992, c. 32, S. 20 (39).

I)

Other Forms of Surgical Interve~tions

In addition to the administration of medications, some psychiatrists, who believed
that certain parts of the body had some connection to mental illness, performed
surgical procedures in an attempt to sever this comection. This belief centered
predominantly around the reproductive or sexual organs. Dr. Isaac Baker-Brown,
a physician fiom Great Britain, performed clitoridectomies in an attempt to treat
l6
mental illness in women in the middle 1 9 century.'
~

In Ontario, Dr. Richard Bucke, superintendent of the London Psychiatrie Hospital,
was also convinced that surgical intervention could alleviate mental illness. He
believed that "insane mast~rbation""~
could be prevented by inserting a wire
through a male patient's foreskin. After twenty-one operations Dr. Bucke
concluded that this procedure was a failure and ceased performing it in 1877. He

' %hortt,

'''m.at 125.

note 29 at 142.
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was not convinced, however, that surgical intervention could not be beneficial. In

1895 Dr. Bucke began performing gynecological surgery on women because he
believed that the reproductive orgaos were linked to the brain."' Over a five year
period Dr. Bucke perfonned various types of gynecological surgery on 209

'

women, believing such surgery could alleviate mental illnrss . l9 Five patients

died but Dr. Bucke reported a 64% rate of improvement: upon subsequent review
of the doctor's records these claims have been said to be ~nsubstantiated."~

Conclusio~
Thus it can be seen that many abuses in the guise of therapy could be found in
practice and the law with respect to comrnittal and involuntary treatment did little

"*short&

note 29 at 141-42.

"9Jbid.at 143. Peter A. Rechnitzer, P . M a c k e (Journev to Cosmiç
o u s m (Markharn: Associated Medical Services & Fitzhery & Whiteside, 1994)
at 19 1 reports that Bucke's gynecological diagnoses were chamterized as follows:

Endometritis
Prolapsed Uterus
Lacerated Perineurn
Lacerated Cervix
Hypertrophied Cervix
Retroverted Uterus
Tumour
Unknown

' 2 0 ~ h ~ m , note 29 at 148-49.
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to prevent such abuses. The laws were reforrned and protective measures were put

in place. However, there continues to be dissatisfaction with the current state of

the law regarding involuntary hospitalization and treatment in Ontario. It is to a
review of the current law regarding cornmitment and hvoluntary treatment in
Ontario that 1 now tum.

CHAPTER 2-CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
Introductiop
Legislation regarding psychiatric hospitalization and capacity to consent to
treatment is found in Ontario in three main statutes: the Mental &alth Act,12' the

..

Substihite D e ç ~ s ~ Act.
~ a s1992

and the Health Care Consent Act. 1996 '23. This

set of iegislation is extensive, especially in cornparison to some other Canadian
jurisdictions.'"

In addition to being cornplex, Ontario's law regarding committal

and treatment is in a considerable stage of flux: in the course of eight years, under
two successive govemments, the legislation has been changed or arnended seven
tirnes.l2'

This arnount of change, in itself, may indicate the continued

'"S. 0. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A.

"'For example, Nova Scotia does not have a separate Mentai Hedth Act, but
AclyR. S.N.S. 1989,
combines general and psychiatric hospitals together in the
c. 208.
'25Beginningin 1991, under the former NDP government the following changes
were made:
to TreaAct. 1992. S.O. 1992, c. 3 1 proclaimed
(1)
.
.
te DecAct. 1 992 S.O. 1992, c. 30 proclaimed
(2)
&iv_oçacv Act. 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 26 proclaimed
(3)
(4)
Consent md C i e i t v S m t e Law
Act, S.O. 1992, c.32
proclairned.
Following much cnticism of the above legislation, especially regarding the complexity
and difficulty of implementing the requirements in clinical practice, the Progressive
Conservative govemment made sweeping changes:
Agivocacy Act. 1992 was repealed in 1995;
(a)
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dissatisfaction that many persons in Ontario feel regarding this area of the law. It
also may poignantly reflect the difficulty that the law has in addressing complex
issues surrounding civil rights, health care concems, and societal expectations.

Since the law regarding psychiatric hospitalization and capacity to consent to

treatment is so complex in Ontario,1 will review it in depth here. To begin, 1 will
set out the current legislation regarding psychiatnc hospitalization of voluntary

patients, detainees, and involuntary patients. 1 will then review the case law
pertaining to hospitalization. Sections of the legislation that have been
misinterpreted or misapplied by health care professionals, the public, patients and
even boards of review will be pariicularly highlighted. The common law
principles regarding restraint will also be reviewed.

Next, I will consider the status of the law regarding treatment. The current
legislation pertaining to treatment will be set out, foliowed by a review of the case
law in this area. The cornmon law regarding treatment will also be highlighted.

(b)
(c)

-nt

to T r e w Act. 1992 was repeaied in 1996;

-th
Gate COAct. 199& S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A. was proclaimed
into force on March 29, 1996.

36

Finally, 1 will explore issues that arise at the intersection of comrnittal and
treatment.

The following scenarios will be specifically reviewed: ïnvoluntary and

incapable patients; involuntary and capable patients; voluntary and capable
patients; and, voluntary and incapable patients. Through this exploration the
dilemma driving this thesis will corne into focus: how is the situation of a

voluntary, treatment incapable patient, who refuses to take medications orally or
to comply with treatments that have been approved by his substitute decision-

maker, to be addressed?

1.
-

A)

The Menta)

~

c

t

~

~

~

Voluntary Patients

There are three ways in which a person may become a voluntary patient in a

psychiatric facility. First, a person may be admitted directly as a voluntary patient

as envisioned by S. 12 of the Mental He&

AC^.'^'

Second, a penon may become

a voluntary patient afier an application for psychiatric assessrnent has been

'"R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7,S. 12 states:
Admission of informal or voluntary patients. -Any person who is
believed to be in need of the observation, care and treatment provided in a
psychiatric facility may be adrnitted thereto as an informal or voluntary
patient upon the recommendation of a physician. R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S.
8; 1986, c. 64, S. 33 (5).
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completed, but the criteria for involuntary admission have not been made out."'

Third, an involuntary certificate may 1 a p ~ e . I ~ ~

There is no definition of a voluntary patient in the Mental Health Act. However,

an Ontario Psychiatrie Review Board,"' in a discussion of the meaning of the term,
has mied that "...the terni clearly connotes a situation wherein the individual bas
the opportunity to exercise his or her own fkee will. ~ ~ 1 3 1

"'R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 20 (1) (b) states:
Duty of attending physician.-?he attending physician, after observing
and exarnining a person who is the subject of an application for
assessrnent under section 15 or who is the subject of an order under
section 32,

........*..........................................*........*...................*-.....*.....
(b) shall admit the person as an informai patient or voluntary patient if the
attending physician is of the opinion that the person is suffering tiom
mental disorder of such a nature or quality that the person is in need of the
treatment provided in a psychiatrie facility and is suitable for admission as
an informai or voluntary patient;.. .

'"R.S.0. 1990, c. M.7,S. 20 (6) states:
Change of status, where period of detention has expiredo--An
involuntary patient whose authorized period of detention has expired shall
be deemed to be an iaformal or voluntary patient. R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S.
14 (6); 1986, c. 64,s. 33 (1 6),part.
13%

s review body is now titled the Consent and Capacity Board.

'"Re J.GL(November 11, 1993, unreported). See H y Bloom and Michael Bay, A
Practical Guide to M m He*
C
m
d Coflsent
- 1
(Toronto:
Carswell, 1996) at 122.
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A voluntary patient is one who rnay be discharged fiom a facility on request."'

Indeed, as stated in S. 14 of the Mental H e w

AC^:'^'

[nlothing in this Act authorizes a psychiatnc facility to detain or
restrain an informal or voluntary patient.
The authority to restrain or detain a voluntary patient, if it is to be found, must be

..

located in either the S _ u b s t i t u I w n s Act. 1992'" or the Health Care Consent
Act. 1996.135

b)

Detainees and Involuntary Patients

Persons rnay be brought into a psychiatrie hospital against their will by means of

an Application for Psychiatrie Assessment (commonly referred to as an %PA" or
"Fom 1").136 While such persons are commonly referred to as involuntary

'j2R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7,S. 14. It should be noted that voluntary
patients rnay not be as fiee to leave a facility as perhaps thought. Some hospitals require
that al1 persons see a physician prior to discharge. This, at the very least, implies a delay
in deparhue. Furthemore, if the physician believes that the patient should remain
hospitalized and if the patient is unwilling to do so voluntarily, the patient rnay be
certified as an involuntary patient if they meet the cntena. Thus seeking to leave, as a
voluntary patient, rnay trigger involuntary committal.

"3.0.
1996, c. 2, Sch. A.
addition to physicians, Justices of the Peace and Peace Officers are given
powers under the
Heath Act to detain any person they suspect is sufXering from a
mental iIlness and rnay cause senous h m to themselves, harm to someone else or is
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patients, such a designation is incorrect: such persons are not patients, but
detainees.13'

S. 15 (1) of the Meml He&

Act

13*

States:

Where a physician examines a person and has reasonable cause to
believe that the person,
has threatened or attempted or is threatening or
(a)
attempting to cause bodily h m to himself or herself;
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person
or has caused or is causing another person to fear bodily harm
fiom him or her; or
has
shown or is showing a lack of cornpetence to care for
(c)
himself or herse1f,
and if in addition the physician is of the opinion that the person is
apparently suffering firom mental disorder of a nature or quality that
likely will result in,
serious bodily harm to the person;
(d)
serious
bodily h m to another person; or
(e)
imminent and serious physical impairment of the person,
(f)
the physician may make application in the prescribed form for a
psychiatric assessment of the person.
The overt criteria or behaviours necessary for a physician to issue an APA are
exhibiting an inability to care for him or herself: see S. 16 regarding the powers of an
order of a Justice of the Peace, and S. 17 in relation to the authority of police officers. It
should be noted that the authority of the Justice of the Peace and police officers extends
only to authorising or bringing the person before a physician for examination (see S. 16
(3) and S. 17), not for the 72 h o u assessment. An examination by a physician consists of
an interview and observation of the patient, typically lasting fiom several minutes (if the
patient is very disturbed and/or cannot provide much information) to a few hours. The 72
hour assessment takes place at a psychiatric facility.
'37&
v. W e b e (1994),
~
95 C.C.C. (3d) 334 at 347 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.))
(hereinafter Webers). See also Bioom and Bay, ~ y p r anote 131 at 123.
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quite broad: they include past behaviour (e.g. "has threatened"), present behaviour
(e.g. "is threatening") and another person's fear of potential behaviour (e-g. "is
causing another person to fear bodily harm fiom him or her"). However, not only

must the p s t , present or potential behaviour criteria be met, the physician must
also believe that the person has a mental disorder that will result in serious bodily
harm to himself, to another, or "imminent and serious physical impairment of the

person .139
YY

An APA is sufficient authority for anyone to deliver the narned person to a

psychiatric facility.l4' Once there, a person may be detained for psychiatric
examination for 72 hours. 14'

An involuntary patient is defmed under the M

e n t a l AC^'^^ as ".-.a person

who is detained in a psychiatric facility under a certificate of involuntary
admission or a certificate of renewal

Y?

.
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A certificate of involuntary admission

may be filled out by a physician after exarnining a detainee in hospital under the
13%4en-

Act R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 7, S. 1S.

R.S.O. 1990, c. M. 7, S. 15 (a).

' ' " M e n e & h Act R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 15 (b).
'j2R.S.0. 1990, c. M.7.

"'R.s.0. 1990, c. M.7,S. 1.

authority of S. 15 (application for psychiatric assessment), or at any time a

voluntary patient meets the critena set out in S. 20 (5):
Conditions precedent to making of certificate of involuntary
admission or certificate of renewa1.--The attending physician shall
not complete a certificate of involuntary admission or a certificate of
renewal unless, after he or she has examined the patient, he or she is
of the opinion both,
that the patient is suffering fiom mental disorder of a
(a)
nature or quality that likely will result in,
(i)
serious bodily harm to the patient,
(ii)
serious bodily h a m to another person, or
(iii) imminent and serious physical impairment of the
patient,
unless the patient remains in the custody of a psychiatric
facility; and
that the patient is not suitable for admission or continuation as
(b)
an informai or voluntary patient.
The physician must believe that the person has a mental illness and that such

illness will likely result in serious bodily h m io that person or someone else, or
imminent and serious impairment of that penon.

A certificate of involuntary admission is sufficient authority to detain a person in a

psychiatric facility for a maximum of two w e e k ~ . Certificates
'~~
of renewal are
issued subsequent to certificates of involuntary admission and may authonze
holding a peaon involuntarily for periods of one, two or three additional

'"Me-

A& R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 20 (4) (a).

An involuntarily cornmitted person, or her representative, may make an application
to the Consent and Capacity Board to challenge her involuntary status.'46 A

decision of the Board may be appealed to the Ontario Court (General Division) on
a question of law or fact or b ~ t h . ' ~ '

The legislation regarding detainees and involuntary patients has been considered in

several cases. In particular, the necessity of the commission of an act before
certification can be initiated, the connection that must exist between the mental
disorder and the risk of h m , and the standard of proof required to be met to
justiQ involuntary commitment have al1 been the subject of judicial interpretation.
In addition, there has been much judicial consideration of the meaning of different
terms or phrases contained in the legislation. For instance, the phrase "likely will
'45pvientpdHedth Act, R.S.O., c. M.7,S. 20 (4) (b) (i), S. 20 (4) (b) (ii), S. 20 (4) (b)
(iii). As long as a patient rneets the criteria for involuntary committal, subsequent
certificates of renewal may be completed by the physician: that is, renewal upon renewal
may be completed. The longest period a person may be held on one renewal certificate,
without the completion of a subsequent renewal, is three months. Once a person
becomes voluntary, in the event of subsequent need for certification, the same process
and time h e s that applied for the initiai involuntary certificate would pertain.

'46M
He-,
R.S.O.1990, c. M.7, S. 39 (1). Note: the Consent and
Capacity Review Board is the new name for the previous Psychiatric Review Board in
Ontario.
"'MentalR.S.O.
,

1990, c. M.7, S. 48 (1).
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result in" in relation to the probability of the patient becoming a danger to himself,
others, or exhibiting an inability to care for hirnself, the meaning of "serious
physical impairment of the person," and "imminent" have al1 received judicial
scrutiny. The following section will review the case law in Ontario that has
considered the issues listcd above.

i)

persons may be detained for examination under S. 15 or held
involuntarily pursuant to S. 20 absent an overt act (e.g. violence to self
or others)

In S t a m v. Pene-ne

-th

the Ontario Court

(General Division) stated that the "Mental Health Act doesn't require proof of
commission of an 'overt act.

,99149

There, a man diagnosed as a pedophile with a

"history of repeated incest, sexual coercion and premeditation in his off en ce^"'^^
challenged his involuntary detention. Although he had not engaged in such
behaviour for some time, the Court held that an overt act was not a necessary
precondition for continued detention as an involuntary patient. Judge O'Driscoll

'48[1994]
O.J.No. 1958 (Q.L.)( hereinafter

149w
at para. 36.
lS0@j&

at para. 22.

m).
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cited both Dav-

v.

and Mc-

v. 0 ' ~ o h - ' "

in support of this

principle.

Similarly, the Ontario District Court in

v. ~ ' ~ o h e r &upheld
" ~ a review

board's decision that a woman's involuntary detention was legal even though no
overt action had transpired. The woman had a history of paranoid schizophrenia
and believed that other people were impersonating and following her. While a

student in a Law and Security course she went to the coilege and threatened to
retum and shoot 22 people she had piaced on a "hit list" if she was not allowed to

graduate from her program and join the R.C.M.P.. In relation to the appellant's

counsel's position that his client was detained unlawfully because she had never
carried through with her threats, the Court replied:
Neither S. 9 [now S. 151 nor S. 14 [now S. 201 of the Mental Health
Act requires an overt act or commission before an involuntary
comrnittal c m be made. In this case there was a preponderance of
evidence of great cogency that the mental disorder of the appellant
had deteriorated to the point where her delusions were begiming to
ovenvhelm her, and she was acting out of control.'"

"'(1987), 62 O.R. ( 2 4 588 at 598 @ist. Ct.) (hereinafter M ) .
"*[1989]0.1. NO.965 @kt. Ct.) (Q.L.) (hereinafter M f ) .

ne 1996 Aniiptated Ontgno Mental

'53Jbidt See also Richard D. Schneider,
Health Statutes (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 1 1.
%
' ,-

note 152 at 19-20.

Citing M

~ , 1Judge
5 5Bolan of the Ontario Court (General Division) overtumed

a finding of a review board in

v. ~ d a m s . 'In
~ îhis
~ case, a penon

involuntarily detained at a psychiatric hospital had a knife in her possession and
had threatened bodily harm to members of the nursing staff. Judge Bolan stated:

In finding that the evidence fell short of establishing a likelihood of
danger to anyone, the Board referred to the fact that not a shred of
evidence indicated that Middel ever carried out any of the threats she
ever made. This is clearly an error in law.

.---..-...................................................................*...............
m..........-..

It suffices to show that there is a likelihood of such an event
0cc-g
. Dr. Adams came to this conclusion based o n evidence of
past threats as well as the nature of the mental disorder it~elf.'~'
Health professionals are often unaware that there does not need to be an overt act
of violence or danger for a person to be subject to the detaining provisions of the

Mental Health Act. A comrnon misconception is "1 can't certifL him because he
hasn't hurt anybody yet." However, this is an emor in law.

-

.

'S5.Mcw,

note 152 at 19-20.

Is6[l9931, OJ.NO.2864 (C.J. (Gen. Div.)) (Q.L.) (hereinafter M i d u ) .

15f&idt at para. 7.

ii)

"likely wW resuit inn158

Section 20 of the Act stipulates that the person must have a mental illness that
"likely will result in" serious bodily h m to self, others, or imminent and serious
physical impairment to the person. "Likely" has been defined as "Flaving an
appearance of truth or fact; that looks as if it would happen, be realized or proved
to be what is alleged or suggested. ~robable.""~Therefore, as Bloom and Bay

point out:

The
does not require that an attending physician be certain
that a particular h m will occur before the physician admits or
continues a patient as an involuntary patient. Rather, the Act
requires that the attending physician form an opinion about whether
or not, as a result of mental disorder, one or more of the harms listed
in S. 20 (5) is likely to occur unless the patient remains in the custody
of a psychiatrie facility.... In c o n s i d e ~ whether
g
or not hann is
"1 ikely", the courts have held that "likely" means "probable", not
"highly probable. 160
3,

iii)

"serious physical impairment of the p e r ~ o n " ' ~ '

Persons with mental illness can experience impairment due to their condition that
seriously affects their ability to care for themselves. "This ground contemplates

1 5 8 M e x @ J 4 Act,
J R.S.O.1990, c. M.7,ss. 15 (1) (f) and 20 (5) (a) (iii).

"'m
v. Anderson (June 28, 198S), Doc. No. Toronto 609/85 (Ont. Dist. Ct.)
(hereinafter m).
Cited with approval in M m
note 152 at 19.
'MBloomand Bay,

note 131 at 127, citïng

I6'InS. 15 (1) (f) and S. 20 (5) (iii) of the Mental Hedth Act.

note 159.
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the situation where a person's mental disorder interferes in such a substantial way

with his or her abilities to provide for at least minimal bodily needs that the person

is at serious r i ~ k . ' "In
~ ~F o r a v. Q ' ~ o h e r t v lJudge
~ ~ Fitzgerald indicated that Mr.

Foran should remain in hospital as he accepted that without such care he would
"take up his aimless and slovenly existence which would ultimately lead to

physical deteri~ration."'~~
However, he overtumed the review board's decision to
confimi the involuntary certificate because there was not convincing evidence that
his discharge would result in "imminent and serious physical impairment."

The resulting physical impairment must be serious. In

v.

Judge

Brown accepted that serious bodily h m "must be more than trifling" as
recognized in

v. McEw_ain?

Judge Brown cautioned that:

[tlhere may, for example, be many persons with mental disorden
who may, in response to the mental disorder be a nuisance to
themselves a d o r others but their behaviour may fa11 far short of
there being a likelihood of serious bodily harm or harm beyond a
mere trifling nature. 16'
'"Bloom and Bay, s u p ~ ânote 13 1 at 87.
'"[L986], O.J. No. 2146 ( Dist. Ct.) (Q.L.) (hereinafier

m).

'"~bid.at 4-5.
165[1993],O.J. No. 1261 ( Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (Q.L.) (hereinafter
'

6

6

~

,

note 15 1.

' 6 7 T r ~sypia
,
note 165 at para. 9.

u).
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It has also been recognized that a person may be so disordered that his conduct

may make him the target of h m by others. InJ,evinskas v. ~ u t s o nthe
l ~ Court
~

ruled that such a risk would be grounds to hold a person under the "imminent and
senous physical impairment of the person" cnteria of the &.'"

iv)

66imminent"'70

The requirement of imminence oniy applies to the risk of serious physical
impairment of the person."' Therefore, the possibility that a person may harm
himself or others does not have to "imminenty' in order for involuntary certification
to occur. The term "imminent9'in relation to senous physical impairment of the

person has been broadly interpreted by the c o u d R in most, but not all, instances.
In G. (G.1 v.

the Ontario District Court affirmed a Board of Review

decision that ruled that imminent and serious physical impairment could result if a

168(1989),16 A C .W.S. (3d) 143 (Ont. Dist. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (hereinafler
Levinskas).

'69m.
See also Bloom and Bay,
'"ln

S.

note 131 at 87.

1 5 (1 ) (f) and S. 20 (5) (iii) of the Mental H e m Act.

I7'AsMichael Bay points out, contrary to the "Toronto Star version of the Mental
Health Act", imminent only applies to physical impairment: see Bay,
note 16 at

125.
'"~loornand Bay,

note 131 at 138.

' n ( ~ p n 4,
l 1986), Doc. No. Thunder Bay 1179186 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).

49

patient was discharged with a history of medication noncornpliance. Should this
person not take her medications, she would deteriorate within "a matter of
w e e k ~ . " 'The
~ ~ Court held that this time fiame was suficient to satisfy the meaning

of "imminent. 9'175

Similarly, in

v. o ' D o ~ ~ the
' "Court held that a person with delusions

that interfered with her understanding of her medical condition, and a history of
increased weight and salt intake that greatly increased her chance of having a
stroke, satisfied the criteria for "imminent and serious physical impairment".
Absent continued hospitalization, the court ruled that the patient was at risk of
suffering a stroke.

As Bloom and Bay point out:

A refùsal to take prescribed medication or a history of noncornpliance with treatment may place a patient at risk of imminent
and serious physical impairment, particularly where the patient has a
history of decompensating w
i about
~ a -th
of dischfiom a
psychiatric facility and thereafter being at risk of senous physical

175Notethat the Court listed as reasons for this person's probable futw
decompensation non-cornpliance with medications and an "apparent lack of community
resources". As will be discussed m e r , it is highly controversial that persons may be
denied their liberty as a resdt of fiscal restraint or administrative inaction.
'76(~pril
14, l986), DOC.NO. l226/86 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
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impairment. 177[ernphasisadded]
However, the Ontario District Court bas also held that a failure to take prescribed
medications following discharge that would likely lead the person to "...take up his
aimless and slovenly existence which would

lead to physical

deterioration" is not sufficient to satisfy the legislative mandate for "$nmi=and
serious physical impairment".178 Judge Fitzgerald stated:
1 have challenged the respondent to show me in the evidence what
specific imminent and serious harm will likely result from this
patient's release beyond some f b t conjectural
~
possibility. He is
unable to do ~ 0 . l ' [emphasis
~
added]

The Judge then "regretfully''180held that the Board of Review had erred in its
decision and rescinded the involuntary certificate.

v)

necessary connection between the mental disorder and the risk of

harmI8'
Sections 15 (1) and 20 (5) are both clearly drafted to indicate that not only must
there be a risk of ham to self, harm to others, or a lack of cornpetence to care for
-

-

inBloom and Bay,

note 13 1 at 138.

178m
SYPC~
note 163.
'79m
at 7.
ls0Jbid.at 8.
'"Bloom and Bay,

note 131 at 128.

St

self, but this nsk must be present as a result of a m w o r d x . "Mental
disorder" is defined broadly in the Mental H e m ' 8 2as "any disease or
disability of the rnind".lg3 As the couris in I ( 1 e k v.

'"

v.

..

H ~ t s o nand
' ~ ~u c e ai v. mlshave
6
held, there must be a comection between
the disease and the outcome of harm to self or others, or the lack of cornpetence to
care for self.

In Diilanceai v. mlsJudge
7
Perras of the Ontario District Court held that simply
because a person with a mental illness had no money, no source of fun&, no place
to stay, and no clear plans for his fuhue was not justification for certification. He
stated:

...under the present law, it does not appear that any review board can
justify confirming a certificate of involuntary admission on the basis
of a fmding of that kind. The cause that will likely result in the
imminent and senous physical impairment of the patient needs to be
related to the mental disorder suffered by the patient. It is not
enough that the impairment might result from a lack of fùnds or of a

"*R.S.O.1990, c. M.7.
Ig3S.1 .

lM[1984]O.J. No. 1540 @ist. Ct.) (Q.L.) (hereinafter

w).

laSnote
m
168.

'"[1988] 0 . J . No. 1079 (Dist. Ct.) (Q.L.)(hereinafter

'87w

m).

place to live."'

vi)

standard of proof required for civil commitment

Because of the civil nature of commitment, it has been held that the standard of
proof required in circumstances of civil cornmitment is a balance of
probabilities. ' 89 However, because of the deprivation of liberty involved, 'ihere

must be clear and cornpelling evidence to support a patient's involuntary detention
in a psychiatric facility97 .1 9 0 In addition, the trier of fact may submit such evidence

to a higher degree of ~crutiny.'~'

B)

ealth Care Consent Act. 1996192

There are three potential penons who may have authority to consent to the
admission of an incapable person to a psychiatric facility: a guardian, a penon
appointed through a power of attorney for persona1 care, and a substitute decision-

d,note 186 at 14.

a
,

lg9SeeCieppor v. piv

[1992] B.C. J. No. 694 (S.C.) (Q.L.);
note 152;
note 159; GAG.) v. Swaniy, yipca note 173;
Diilanceai y l p ~ anote 186; D a v k , ~ ~ e note
ç ô 151.

,m.,

a

'90~loom
and Bay,
note 13 1, citing G. fGJ v. S w w ,
McKay, sripra note 152. See also Enrpn, yipra note 163 at 8 and

m,

paragraph 7.

I9'JvlcIQy, SUD^^ note 152 at 18.
'92S.0.1996, c. 2, Sch. A.

note 173 and
note 165 at

rnal~er.''~First, under the authority of this Act, a guardian appointed after an
application has been made to the court through the procedure outlined in the

..

Substitute thwms Act 1992'94 may have the authority to consent to an incapable
person's admission to a psychiatric fa~i1ity.I~~
Section 24 states:

(2) Objection, psychiatric facilitp- If the incapable person is 16
years old or older and objects to being admitted to a psychiatric
facility for treatment of a mental disorder, consent to his or her
admission may be given only by,
his or her guardian of the person, if the guardian has authority
(a)
to consent to the admission1%
Second, a person who has been granted the incapable penon's power of attorney
may have the power to consent to the incapable person's admission to a psychiatric
facility, over his or her objection. This power would only exist if the authonty to
give such consent was explicitly contained in the power of attorney.'" Such

substitute decision-maker is essentially any one who makes a decision on
behalf of another. While guardians and persons who have been appointed by another in a
Power of Attorney for Personal Care are substitute decision-makers, the tenn, used in this
section relates to persons who have not been given explicit authority through a Court
Order or POAPC but have been called upon to make a decision for another.
' 9 3 ~

guardian may be full or partial and have differing authority: this will be
..
explained M e r in the following section on the Substitute D e v s Act. 1992 .
' 9 S ~

' % H e a l t h b ~ o n s e nAct.
t 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 24 (2) (a).
l9'&&h Care C-t
Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 24 (2) (b) states:
Objection, psychiatric faci1ity.--If the incapable person is 16 years old or
older and objects to king admitted to a psychiatric facility for treatment of
a mental disorder, consent to his or her admission rnay be given only by,

54

Powers of Attorney are often referred to as Ullysses con tract^.'^^ If the authority
was not provided in the power of attomey, the person narnedàs the attorney for

persona1 care decisions could not consent to the admission over the incapable
person's objections.

Finally, a substitute decision-maker may authorize the admission of an incapable
person to a psychiatric facility if the incapable person, who is over 16, does not
refuse admission for the purpose of treatment. Sections 24 (1) and (2) of the Act
state:
(1) Admission to hospital, etc.--Subject to subsection (2), a
substitute decision-maker who consents to a treatment on an
incapable person's behalf may consent to the incapable person's
admission to a hospital or psychiatric facility or to another health
facility prescribed by the regulations, for the purpose of the
treatment.

(2) Objection, psychiatric faci1ity.--If the incapable person is 16
years old or older and objects to beïng admitted to a psychiatric
facility for treatment of a mental disorder, consent to his or her
admission may be given only by,
his or her guardian of the person, if the guardian has authonty
(a)

@)

his or her attorney for personal are, if the power of attorney
contains a provision authonpng the attorney to use force that is
necessary and reasonable in the circumstances to admit the
incapable person to the psychiatric facility and the provision is
. . Act.
effective under subsection 50 (1) of the

-ans

1992.
Ig8SeeChapter 2, p. 75-76

(b)

to consent to the admission; or
his or her attorney for persona1 care, if the power of attorney
contains a provision authoriziag the attorney to use force that
is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances to admit the
incapable person to the psychiatrïc facility and the provision
is effective under subsection 50 (1) of the Substitute
Decisions Act, 1992.

The H

H does acknowledge another situation wherein a

person may be restrained or confined: section 7 of the

States:

Restraint, confinement.--This Act does not affect the comrnon law
duty of a caregiver to restrain or confme a person when irnmediate
action is necessary to prevent serious bodily h m to the person or to
oîhers.
Therefore, should a patient act out towards himself or another, the members of the

health care team would be justified, and in fact, would have a &&y to use physical
or manual restraint, or to confme the person.

At cornmon law a person "...may use force to rescue a person, even a stranger,

. .

from atta~k.'"~'A similar p ~ c i p l has
e been codified in the Çnminal Code in S.
37:
(1)

(2)

Every one is justified in using force to defend himself or any
one under his protection fiom assault, if he uses no more
force than is necessary to prevent the assault or the repetition
of it.
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to justifL the wilîùl
infliction of any hurt or mischief that is excessive, having

lWWe&,

note 137.

regard to the nature of the assault that the force used was
intended to prevent?'
Therefore, a caregiver would be justified in restraining a patient in order to protect
other patients, or themselves nom suffering injuries. This justification could be
seen to be as a result of the relationship of the caregiver to the patient, or because
the patient could be characterized as a person under his or her protection.

The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1978 that a hospital had a duty to protect its
patients fkom the forseeable violent acts of a psychiatric patient.20' In Lawsoa v.
Welleslev Hospital the Court stated:
It was not doubted by counsel for the parties that at common law a
hospital, especially one providing treatment for mentally-il1 persons,
would be under a common law liability if by reason of its failure to
provide adequate control and supervision injury occurred to third
parties by reason of the conduct or behaviour of a patient.'02
The situation of restraining a patient to prevent them fiom self harm is not as clear.
Cornmon sense dictates that if a person is an inpatient at a psychiatric facility and
he attempts to kill or h m himself, the staff will be justified, and most would Say,

Io'~ a w s o n
v.

Welleslev H o a (1 978), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 688 (hereinafter Lawson).

* O 2 M at 691. See also
v. -e
L t d [1986] 4 W.W.R. 559 (Sask.
Q.B.) where a patient with a history of violence struck another patient and the facility was

held liable for failing to ensure the safety of the resident.

required to prevent this nom occuming. The person would certainly then meet the
criteria for forma1 committal. As one author has put it:
[wlhen the threat posed by the mentally incapable person is a threat
only to himself, the courts will likely infer the consent of the relevant
person (the substitute consent-giver) to the imposition of restraints;
or, to achieve the same sensible end, will press into service the socalled emergency doctrine.203
However, it should be noted that this common law authority to restrain and detain
exists only in response to the possibility of the patient becoming a danger to
himself or others: that is, a psychiatric emergency situation. It cannot be used as
justification to restrain or detain a voluntary patient who is resisting treatment. In
particular, it is this author's belief that for the time the voluntary, treatment
incapable person who is resisting treatment, is physically restrained in order to be
involuntarily treated, she has been detained. This common law exception cannot
be used as authority for such an action.

c)

..

204

Substitute Decisions Act. 1992

..

The Substitute Decislpgis Act. 1992 is concemed with mainly two types of
persons who may make decisions on behalf of another: a guardian and a person

'03~arneySneiderman, John C . IrWie and Philip H.Osborne, (Canadian Medicd
Law (Toronto: CarsweH, 1995) at 162.

acting under the authority of a power of attorney. A guardian of a personzo5must
be court appointed. Section 55 states:
(1) Application for appointment.--The court may, on any person's

application, appoint a guardian of the person for a person who is
incapable of personal care and, as a result, needs decisions to be
made on his or her behalf by a person who is authorized to do so.

(2) Prohibition.--The court shall not appoint a guardian if it is
satisfied that the need for decisions to be made will be met by an
alternative course of action that,
does not require the court to fmd the person to be
(a)
incapable of personal care; and
is less restrictive of the person's decision-making
(b)
rights than the appointment of a guardiado6
A court may grant either full or partial g~ardianship.~~'
Full guardianship could be

ordered if the person was found incapable of making personal care decisions in al1
of the areas outlined in S. 45 of the Act which states:

Incapacity for persoaal care.--A person is incapable of persona1
care if the person is not able to understand information that is
relevant to making a decision concerning his or her own health care,
nutrition, shelter, clothing, hygiene or safety, or is not able to
appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or
lack of d e c i ~ i o n . ~ ' ~

..

ecisiow Act. 1 992 also makes provisions for guardians of property :
see ss 15, 16, and 22.
206

Substitute De-2,

e
e-

..

.
..

S.O. 1992, c. 30.

w Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, ss. 59 and 60.
Act. 1992, S.O.

1992, c. 30.

The authority of a person who has been granted full guardianship of another in
respect of personal care is quite extensive. Section 59 (2) and (3) set out those
powers.209 A guardian with full authority may consent to an incapable person's
admission to a psychiatrie facility for the purposes of treatment, even over the

'09S. 59 (2) and (3) state:

(2) Powers of guardiam-Under an order for full guardianship, the
guardian may,
exercise custodial power over the person under
guardianship, determine his or her living arrangements and
provide for his or her shelter and safety;
be the person's litigation guardian, except in respect of
litigation that relates to the person's property or to the
guardian's status or powers;
settle claims and commence and settle proceedings on the
person's behalf, except claims and proceedings that relate
to the person's property or to the guardian's status or
powers;
have access to personal information, including health
information and the release of that information to another
person, except for the purposes of litigation that relates to
the person's property or to the guardian's status or powers;
on behalf of the person, make any decision to which the
Health Cure Consent Act, 1996applies;
make decisions about the person's health care, nutrition and
hygiene
make decisions about the person's employment, education,
training, clothing and recreation and about any social
services provided to the person; and
exercise the other powers and perform the other duties that
are specified in the order. 1996, c. 2, S. 37 (1).
(3) Power to apprehend person.--If the guardian has custodial power
over the person and the court is satisfied that it rnay be necessary to
apprehend him or her, the court rnay in its order authorize the guardian to
do so; in that case the guardian may, with the assistance of a police officer,
enter the premises specified in the order, between 9 a-m.and 4 p.m. o r
during the hours specified in the order, and search for and remove the
person, using such force as rnay be necessary.

60

person's objection, under the authority of S. 24 of the w t h Care Co-t

Act

1996.210

The court may also grant partial guardianship: that is, make an order giving the
guardian the power to make decisions in one of the areas outlined in S. 45, such as

health care, an area in which the person is incapable to make decisions. Section 60

..

of the Substitute Decisipns Act. 1992 provides the authority for the Court to make
Orders for partial guardianship."' The authority of the guardian must be set out in

the Order in relation to the powea listed in S. 59 (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the

..

Substitute Dec1s-t.

.''*

1992

Therefore, if an Order was obtained from the

Court for partial guardianship in respect of health care, by v h e of S. 24 of the

Health Care C ~ l l ~ eAnct t 1996, a guardian could consent to the admission of an

*''S.O. 1996,~.2, Sch. A.

. . Act. 1992 relates to partial guardianship:
Decisions
(1) Partial guardiansbip.--The court may make an order for the partial
guardianship of the person for an incapable person if it finds that he or she
is incapable in respect of some but not al1 of the functions referred to in
section 45.
"'S.60 of the -tute

(2) Same.--The order shall specify in respect of which fùnctions the person
is found to be incapable.

(3) Powers of guardiam--Under an order for partial guardianship, the
guardian may exercise those of the powers set out in subsection 59 (2), (3),
(4) and (5) that are specified in the order. 1 996,c. 2, S. 38.
Act, 1992 S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 60 (3).
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incapable person to a psychiatric facility for the purposes of treatment, even
against the patient's own wishes.'"

Second, a capable person may execute a power of attomey for persona1 care which
confers authority on a substitute decision-maker to make decisions in the event of
friture in~apacity.~]~
A grantor may authorize her substitute to have her admitted

and detained in a psychiatric facility for the purpose of treatment. Section 50 (2)

..

(2) of the S u b m t e Decisions Actl 1992 provides this authority:
A provision that authorizes the attomey and other persons under the
direction of the attomey to use force that is necessary and reasonable
in the circumstances to take the grantor to any place for care or
treatment, to admit the grantor to that place and to detain and restrain
the grantor in that place duting the care or treatment.

In addition, a person who has been named under a Power of Attorney for Penonal
Care [hereinafier "POAPC"] to make decisions on anothet's behalf in the event of

future incapacity has the authority to consent to the incapable person's admission
to a psychiatric facility for the purpose of treatment, even absent a specific

'"It should be remembered that the provision applies if the person is over 16.

1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 46 (1) states:
Power of attorney for personal care.--A person may give a written
power of attorney for personai care, authorking the person or persons
narned as attorneys to make, on the grantor's behalf, decisions conceming
the grantor's personal care.

..

Decisipns Act. 1992,2'5 authonzes a

provision in the POAPC. The -te

person narned as an attomey for personal care to make any decisions to which the
H e a l t h s -ions

Act. 1 9 9 6 ~applies.
'~
Section 49 (1) of the Substitute

Act. 199Z2'' States:

When power of attorney effective.--A provision in a power of
attomey for persona1 care that confers authority to make a decision
concerning the grantor's personal care is effective to authorize the
attomey to make the decision if,
the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 applies to the
(a)
decision and that Act authorizes the attomey to make
the decision; or
(b) the Health Care Cornent Act, 1996 does not apply to
the decision and the attorney has reasonable grounds to
believe that the grantor is incapable of making the
decision, subject to any condition in the power of
attomey that prevents the attomey fkom making the
decision unless the fact that the grantor is incapable of
persona1 care has been confirmed.
Therefore, since the power to have a person admitted to a psychiatrie facility for
the purposes of treatment is provided by the Wth Care Consent Act. 19962'8inS.
24 (l), a person named as a substitute decision-maker through a Power of

Attorney for Penonal Care can have the grantor admitted to hospital for treatment,

-

-

2'5S.0. 1992, c. 30.
216S.0.1996, C. 2, Sch. A.

2"S.0. 1992, c. 30.
2'aS.0. 1996, C. 2, ScL. A,

S.

24 (1).
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even absent a specific provision in the POAPC to do so. However, should the
person, 16 years of age or older, refuse admission under the authority of his
substitute decision-maker, such admission cannot be authori~ed.~'~

..

The Substitute Decisions Act- 1992 does recognize that a penon in a facility may

be restrained or confined under the authority of the common law, regardless of
admission stahis. S. 66 (1 1) States:

Common 1aw.--Nothhg in this Act affects the common law duty of
caregivers to restrain or confine persoas when immediate action is
necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to them or others.
Again, this authority cannot be used as justification for restraint and confinement
of a voluntary patient who is not posing a danger to herself or others. In particular,
it cannot be used in order to justify restraining and detaining a voluntary person for

the purposes of treatment (as opposed to restraint for the emergency situation).

'
I
9
m Con-~ct.
1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 24 (2). Note that the
term substitute decision-maker in this section of the chapter refers to a person who must
make a decision for another who is treatment incapable, but does not refer to a guardian
or person who has authority under a POAPC to restrain and detain the person for
purposes of treatment.

II.

Treatmeat

As noted earlier, legislation regardhg mental health is contained in

the HkIW-i

pieces of legislation in Ontario: the ~en--,"O

..

Act. 1996:~' and the Substitute Deci-

main

Act. 1992.= The word "treatment" is

defmed only in the W t h Care C o r n Act. 1996."

Involuntary treatment refers to a situation where an incapable person does not
accept the treatment that has been ordered by his physician, and consented to by
his substitute decision-maker. For example, if the physician had ordered
medication three times per day by mouth, and the patient refused to take it, he
could be restrained by the nursing staff and have the medication delivered by

if electroconvulsive therapy was ordered and the patient
i n j e c t i ~ n .Similarly,
~~
refused, nursing staff would be forced to restrain the patient to a stretcher and

"'S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A.

2 2 4 ~shouid
t
be noted that not d l medications can be administered by injection as
they are not manufactured in that form (e.g. Lithium Carbonate used in the treatment of
people with bipolar affective disorder/manic depression).
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administer any additional restraint necessary until the treatment was ~ o m p l e t e d . ~ '

The authority to administer involuntary treatment is contained in the W t h Care
Consent Act. 1

..

and the Substifute D e c i s w Act. 1992."' The Mental

Health ACP~
refers to treatment only in reference to the criteria for admission to a

psychiatric f a c i l i p 9 and in relation to instructions regarding p s y c h ~ s u r g e r y . ~ ~ ~

..

The Health Care Consent Act. 1996=' and the Substitute D e c ~ ~ o n
Act.
s 1992232

"AS should be apparent, the provision of involuntary treatment to a resisting
patient is stressful for al1 persons involved. Foremost, the patient may be either angry or
extremely fiightened, and undoubtably distressed. In addition, the nursing staff, those
persons responsible for a c W y administering the treatment that has been ordered by the
physician and consented to by a substitute or attorney, are also placed under much stress.
While aware of their role in administering treatment, many are uncornfortable when
forced into such a seemingly combative role with the patient that is difficult to merge
with the necessity of forming a therapeutic relationship with patients. In addition, there is
also the risk of physical injury that can occur when restraining a person who does not
wish to receive treatment.

?S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A.

"S. 12 (regarding infonnal or voluntary patients), and S. 20 (1) @) (regarding the
admission of voluntary patients following a psychiatric assessment) both state that
admission is warranted if the person is in "need of treatment."

Zj'S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A.
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use the words "capable" and "incapable" regarding a person's ability to make
decisions, while many people continue to employ "competent" and "incompetent."

A person may be declared mentafly incapable regarding treatment, '33 property,"'
d i s c l o s ~ r eor~examination
~~
of his own clinical record,236admission to a care

fa~ility,~~'
and consent to a personal assistance d e v i ~ e . ~This
~ ' thesis will
concentrate exclusively on persons who have been found to be incapable of

making treatment decisions.

U 3 w t hCare Consent Act. 1994. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 18.
U4MentêlHe&

Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7,S. 54.

u 5 ~ e Health
u
Ac, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 35 (3).

U 6 ~ e nHa

u Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, S. 36 (1).

U 7 H e a l m e ~ S.O.
6 , 1996,c.2, Sch. A, S. 40 (1).
*8J-Iealth Care Consent Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 57 (1). S. 1 of the
Act States:
"personal assistance senice" means assistance with or s u p e ~ s i o nof
hygiene, washing, dressing, grooming, eating, drinking, elirnination,
arnbulation, positioning or any other routine activity of living, and
includes a group of personal assistance services or a plan setting out
personal assistance services to be provided to a person, but does not
include anything prescribed by the regdations as not constituting a
personal assistance service.

nt Act. 1996239

A)
a)

Treatment Capable Patients

"Capacity" is defhed in S. 4 (1) of the w t h Care Cornent Act 1995:
A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care
facility or a personal assistance service if the person is able to
understand the information that is relevant to making a decision
about the treatment, admission or personai assistance service, as the
case may be, and able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of a decision or lack of decision.

A person is presumed to be capable unless there is "... reasonable cause to believe

By extension of the definition of "capacity" set out in S. 4 of the Act,
~thenvise".*~~
a person will be found incapable of making treatment decisions if she cannot

understand or appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of giving or
refüsing consent.

If a person is capable, consent must be obtained fiom him to proceed with

3 9 S . ~ 1996,
.
c. 2, Sch. A.

Care C o ~Act.
t 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A., S. 4 (2) and (3) States:
(2) Presumption of capacity.--A person is presumed to be capable with
respect to treatment, admission to a care facility and personal assistance
senices.
(3) Exception.-A person is entitled to rely on the presurnption of capacity
with respect to another person unless he or she has reasonable grounds to
believe that the other person is incapable with respect to the treatment, the
admission or the personai assistance service, as the case rnay be.

treat~nent.~"For such consent to be valid it must be inforrned."'

A "blanket"

assessrnent of capacity does not exist: capacity is decision ~ p e c i f i c . *Consent
~~

may be withdrawn at any time.z44

'"Sec common law emergency exceptions at p. 73.
Care CoAct. 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 1 1 states:
(1) Elements of Consent.--The following are the elements required for
consent to treatment:
1.
The consent must relate to the treatment.
2.
The consent must be informed.
3.
The consent must be given voluntarily.
4.
The consent m u t not be obtained through misrepresentation or
fiaud.
(2) Infonned consent.--A consent to treatrnent is infonned if, before
giving it,
the person received the information about the matters set out in
(a)
subsection (3) that a reasonable person in the same circumstances
would require in order to make a decision about the treatment; and
the
person received responses to his or her requests for additional
(b)
infonnation about those matters.
(3) Same.--The matters referred in subsection (2) are:
1.
The nature of the treatment.
2.
The expected benefits of the treatment.
3.
The material risks of the treatment.
4.
The material side effects of the treatment.
5.
Alternative courses of action.
6.
The likely consequences of not having the treatment.
(4) Express or irnp1ied.--Consent to treatment may be express or implied.

243J-IealthCare Consent Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A., S. 15 (1) and (2) state:
(1) Capacity depends on treatment.--A person may be incapable with
respect to some treatments and capable with respect to others.
(2) Capacity depends on timt--A person may be incapable with respect
to a treatment at one time and capable at another.
tnZ
U
Act. 1995. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 14 states:
Withdrawal o f consent^-A consent that has k e n given by or on behalf of
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b)

Treatment Incapable Patients

In the event a person is found incapable of making decisions regarding treatment, a
substitute decision-maker must be approached for consent?45The t e m substitute
decision-maker [often referred to as SDM] is defined in the Health Care Consent
Act. 1996 in S. 9:2'

Meaning of Usubstitute decision-makerW.--Inthis Part, ' S ~ ~ b ~ t i t u t e
decision-rnaker" means a person who is authorized under section 20
to give or refuse consent to a treatment on behalf of a person who is
incapable with respect to the treatment.
The Healb Care Consent Act 1996247lists those persons who may act in this
capacity in S. 20 (1). It should be noted that this list is hierarchical in nature: the
person highest up on the list is to be approached fmt to provide substitute

the person for whom the treatment was proposed may be withdrawn at any
tirne,
by the person, if the person is capable with respect to the
(a)
treatment at the time of the withdrawal;
by the person's substitute decision-maker, if the person is
(b)
incapable with respect to the treatment at the time of the
withdrawal.

Care CoAct. 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A., S. 1 0 (1) (b).
Exceptions to the requirement for consent will be discussed further at p 73. It should be
noted that a person who disagrees with the fïnding of a physician that he or she is
incapable of making treatment decisions may appeal such a fhding to the Consent and
Capacity Board (S. 32 (1)).
"'&&th

2 4 6 ~1996,
. 0 . c. 2, Sch. A.

consent."'

A substitute decision-rnaker (hercinafter SDM) must meet certain

requirements as set out in S. 20 (2):

Requirements--A person described in subsection (1) may give or
refuse consent only if he or she,
is capable with respect to the treatrnent;
(a)
is at least 16 years old, unless he or she is the incapable
(b)
person's parent;
is not prohibited by court order or separation agreement fkom
(c)
having access to the incapable person or giving or refusing
consent on his or her behalf;
(d)
is available; and
is willing to assume the responsibility of giving or refusing
(e)
consent.249

The substitute decision-maker must make an informed choice as set out in S. 1 1 of
the Act. In order to make such a decision for an incapable person, the SDM must
be provided with al1 necessary i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~

Any decision made by a substitute decision-maker on behalf of a treatment
incapable person must be made according to any express wishes the incapable

248&&b Care Co-t.

1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A,

S.

20 (30).

249Healt
S.O.
h
1996,
~
c. 2,
~
Sch.
, A.
"O&&h Care Consent Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 22 States:
Information.--Before giving or refusing consent to a treatrnent on an
incapable person's behalf, a substitute decision-maker is entitled to receive
al1 the information required for an informed consent as described in
subsection 1 1 (2).
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person made known while capable and over the age of 16?

In the event such

wishes are not known, or they cannot be complied with, a decision should be made
following the best interests criteria set out in S. 2 1 (2).

The question that arises at this point, given that the focus in this thesis is on

invoiuntary treatment of voluntary patients, is what constitutes treatment-cm a
substitute decision-maker consent to the actions necessary to deliver treatrnent to a
voluntary, treatment incapable patient (e.g. physical restraint)?

c)

Definition of treatment

"treatrnent" means anything that is done for a therapeutic,
preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related
purpose, and includes a course of treatment or plan of treatment, but
does not include,
(a)
the assessment for the purpose of this Act of a peeon's
capacity with respect to a treatment, admission to a care
facility or a persona1 assistance service, the assessment for the
purpose of the Substitute Decisiuns Act, 1992 of a penon's
capacity to manage property or a person's capacity for
persona1 care, or the assessment of a person's capacity for any
other purpose,
the assessment or examination of a person to determine the
(b)
general nature of the person's condition,
the taking of a person's health history,
(c)
the communication of an assessment or diagnosis,
(d)
the admission of a person to a hospital or other facility,
(e)
251-~.

1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A,

S.

21 (1).

(f)
(g)
(h)

a persona1 assistance service,
a treatment that in the circumstances poses M e or no risk of
hann to the person,
anything prescribed by the regulations as not constituting
treatment.

It might be argued that the phrase "anything done for a therapeutic purpose" in the

definition in S. 2 (1) could include the actual physical restraint by the members of
the health care team that is necessary in order to administer medication ordered by

the physician, and consented to by a substitute decision-maker with appropriate
authority, to treat an incapable patient. It could also be argued that it includes any
mechanical restraint necessary to adrninister such treatment as electroconwlsive
therapy (e.g. restraint to a stretcher). However, 1 would argue against such a broad
interpretation. For the period that the incapable person is physically restrained by
nurses to be given a needle, or restrained to a stretcher while having
electroconvulsive therapy administered, she is unable to leave the facility. Her
voluntary status, during that time, becomes, in actual fact, a nullity. Reading
treatment broadly blurs the committal -involuntary treatment distinction that has
been at the heart of law reform in this area for decadesz2 and is, indeed, reflected
''As noted in Chapter 1, the law in Ontario of years past did not separate
cnteria for commitment from decisions regarding consent to treatment. Once a
person was admitted to a psychiatric facility, treatment was given. The M e d
Health Act. 1962 separated criteria for involuntary cornmitment from the issue of
treatment. The courts have recognized that capable persons have the right to
refuse treatment and incapable persons in psychiatric facilities must have their

in the clear statement in this section of the Act to the effect that treatment does not

include admission to a hospital or other fa~ility.~'~

d)

Exception to Consent Requirement
e Health Care C

w Act. 1996 sets out that consent does not have to be

obtained fiom another on the behalf of an incapable person in the event of an
e m e r g e n ~ y .Section
~~
25 (2) States:

Emergeacy treatment without consent: incapable person.-Despite section 10, a treatment may be administered without consent
to a person who is incapable with respect to the treatment, if, in the
opinion of the health practitioner proposing the treatment,
there is an emergency; and
(a)
the
delay required to obtain a consent or refusa1 on the
(b)
person's behalf will prolong the suffering that the
person is apparently experiencing or will put the
person at risk of sustaining senous bodily

prior capable wishes honoured, even if that results in no treatment for psychiatric
Act. 1996 defmition of treatment included
symptoms. If the - m e n t
the authority to detain an incapable person to a psychiatric facility, the law would
have regressed to the point it was pre 1967, taking the hard-fought victories for
and by persons with mental ilinesses with it.
L53J3eaIth
Care Co-

Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 2 (1) (e).

z4c'Emergency"is defined in S. 25 (1) of the 1
as:
Meanhg of 'emergencym--For the purpose of this section and section 27,
there is an emergency if the person for whom the treatment is proposed is
apparently expenencing severe suffering or is at nsk, if the treatment is not
adrninistered promptly, of sustaining serious bodily h m .

2S5J-Iealth
Care Consent Act. 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 25 (2).

The authority to restrain a person in an emergency is found in the W l t h Cars
Consent Act 1996 in S. 7:

Restraint, confinement.--This Act does not affect the comrnon law
duty of a caregiver to restrain or confine a penon when imrnediate
action is necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to the person or to
others.
Therefore, in an emergency a person can be treated without consent,'s6 and
restraint can be used to deliver such emergency treat~nent.~"

To surn up, voluntary, treatment incapable patients cannot be restrained for the
purposes of treatment, except for in emergency situations, under the authority of
the Health Care Consent Act. 1996. 1 now turn to a review of the other Acts to see
if a different position can be supported on the basis of that legislation.

Act. 1992258

B)

Incapacity for personai care is defined in S. 45 of the Act:
A person is incapable of personal care if the person is not able to
understand information that is relevant to making a decision
conceming his or her own health care, nutrition, shelter, clothing,
hygiene or safety, or is not able to appreciate the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.

2 5 6 u t h ~ ~ - ,

S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 25 (2).

2 S 7 & d t h ~ t ~ 1 9 9S.O.
6 .1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 7.
258S.0. 1992, c. 30.
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A person who is incapable of making treatment decisions must have those

decisions made by another. In order to prepare for a funue period of incapacity, an
individual may execute a Power of Attorney for Persona1 Care (i6POAPC"). Many
people have not executed such a document. Therefore, it is important to review
the scope of decisions that can be made by another on the behalf of a treatment
incapable person where a POAPC exists, and where one does not.

a)

Power of Attorney for Personal Care Exists

A POAPC allows a named person to exercise decision making power should the

grantor becorne incapable of making treatrnent de ci si on^.^'^ Any decision that is
explicitly authorized in the POAPC may be consented to by the named attomey.

A person may be given the authonty in a Power o f Attorney for Persona1 Care to

force treatment on the incapable person. S. 50 (2) (2) States:
A provision that authorizes the attorney and other persons under the
direction of the attorney to use force that is necessary and reasonable
in the circurnstances to take the grantor to that place and to detain
and restrain the grantor in that place during the care or treatment.'"

Should such an incapable, voluntary person resist treatrnent, the authority
provided in the Power of Attomey for Personal Care would be sufficient for
-

-- - --

- -- -

..

te D e c w n s Act, 1992,S.O. 1992, c. 30,

..

eci-

Ac-,

S.O. 1992, c. 30.

S.

46 (1).
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members of the health care tearn to restrain the person in order to administer
treatmenf even over his or her objection. While it is tnie that the voluntary patient
would then be prevented fiom leaving the facility during those times of restraint,
this detention is legal since the named person exercising authority under the Power
of Attorney for Persona1 Care also has the authority to consent to the detention of

the person. It should be remembered that authority originated in the first place
with the person who is now incapable, when he executed such a directive while

capable. The penon acting as his substitute is following explicit instructions of
the person who is now incapable.

If there is no specific provision in the Power of Attorney for Personal Care for the
named individual to have the now incapable peaon admitted, restrained and
detained for the purposes of treatrnent, the substitute decision-rnaker can still
attempt to have the person admitted to a psychiatric facility. However, if the
person is 16 years of age or older, objects, and is voluntary the admission cannot
be f ~ r c e d . * Even
~'
if the person did not object to the admission to the psychiatric

facility, I would argue that treatrnent could not be forced for the reasons given in
the Section on the H e u Care Co-

-

-

-

Act. 1996.262

-

261Health
Care consent Act 1996. S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A,
2 6 2 ~ p.
e e7 1-73.

S. 24.
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Where a POAPC explicitly does not give the authotity for another to consent to
restraint for the purposes of treatment, it is clear that the substitute decision-maker
could not provide such consent in the event of a fiiture period of incapacity.

b)

Where No Power of Attorney for Personal Care Exists

The Substitute Dec-

..

Act. 1992 also sets out provisions for the appointment of

a guardian by the Court, as set out earlier in this C h a ~ t e r . ~The
~ ' Court may
appoint a guardian with powers to make decisions regarding health care if the
person is incapable of making such decisions and has not executed a POAPC.'~~
A
full guardianship order would enable the guardian to make decisions regarding

where the person re~ided?~'in relation to any matter to which the Health Carg

Consent a ~ p l i e d : ~regarding
~
the person's health care, nutrition and
h~giene,'~'
and any other powers specified in the court ~ r d e r . ' ~ ' The authority of
a person who has full guardianship over another may arguably be suficient to
allow for restraint for the purposes of treatment since the person may make

2 6 3 ~ epages
e
57-61 .

e
c
at S.
266&,&

..

59 (2) (a).

at S. 59 (2) (e).

267~bi8,
at S. 59 (2)

(e. 1).

2681bid,at S. 59 (2) (g).

1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, ss. 59 or 60.

decisions regarding where the person resides.

A person may be granted partial guardianship over a n ~ t h e r . ' The
~ ~ authority of

~'
if
such a penon would be granted expressly in the Court ~ r d e r . ~Therefore,
authotity was granted to make decisions regarding health care and residence, an

incapable person could be detained at a psychiatric facility and given treatment
consented to by his guardian, even if restraint was required to administer such
treatment. However, if the Order pertained only to the authority to make decisions
regarding health care, the authority to have a voluntary, incapable person
restrained for the purposes of treatment would arguably not be conveyed by the
Order. Specific authority to detain anaor restrain would be required in the
Order.

C)

Mentn17'

The Mental Health ~

c states:
f ~

~

[n]othing in this Act authorizes a psychiatric facility to detain or

..

ecuons Act- 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 60.
270

..

e Dec-

Act,

"'R.s.O.
1 9 9 0 , ~M
..7.
"R.s.O. 1990, c. M.7.

S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 60 (3).
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restrain an infonnal or voluntary patientF3
As has just been reviewed, the m t h Care Consent Act. 1996 and the Substitute

Decisions Act. 1992provide that authority in some circumstances.

The M e n a H e m AC^" does define "substitute decision-maker" in S. 1:
"substitute decision-maker", in relation to a patient, means the
person who would be authorized under the W t h Care C o w n t AcL
1996 to give or refuse consent to a treatment on behalf of the patient,
if the patient were incapable with respect to the treatment under that
Act ....
With the passage of the Eeaw Care ~ o ~ e n t t , _ 1 9 9 6and
~ ~the
' Substitute
Decisi-

Act. 1992;"

the legislative guidelines regarding consent to treatment,

and specifically involuntary treatment, were removed fiom the Mental He&

However, the Mental Health Act remains relevant as it stipulates that
psychosurgery cannot be performed on an incapable person, even with the consent

273Men&lH e m k R.S.0-,
C. M.7,S. 14. However, as explicitly enunciated

..

in both the
A c u 9 9 & and Substitute DecAct. 1992,
this prohibition against restraining persons does not affect the cornmon law duty of
caregivers to restrain or confine persons in order to prevent serious bodily harm to
the patient, or to others. See 55 and 63.

of his or her substitute decisi~n-rnaker.~~~
Section 49 (1) states:

Psychosurgery.--Psychosurgery shall not be administered to an
involuntary patient, to a person who is incapable of giving or
refusing consent to psychosurgery on his or her own behaif for the
purpose of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, or to a peeon who is
remanded or detained in a psychiaûic faciiity pursuant to the
Criminal Code (Canada). 1987, c. 37, S. 11; 1992, c. 32, S. 20 (39);
1996, c. 2, S. 72 (30).

D)

Common Law Applicable to Treatment

a)

no treatment is to be given without consent

It has been a longstanding principle of Canadian law that anyone providing

treatment, absent consent, or an exception to the consent

"

will be liable for

'H e a ~
A c R.S.O.
~

1990, c. M.7,S. 49. It should be noted that S. 49 (2)
stipulates that psychosurgery for the treatment of neurological disorders is not inciuded in
the prohibitions in S. 49 (1).
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There are exceptions made for emergency situations: see Malette v. Shulmm

(1 WO), 72 O.R. (2d) 417 (C.A.) where Justice Robins states:

The emergency situation is an exception to the general d e requiring a
patient's pnor consent. When immediate medical treatment is necessary
to save the life or preserve the health of a person who, by reason of
unconsciousness or extreme illness, is incapable of either giving or
withholding consent, the doctor may proceed without the patient's
consent. The delivery of rnedicai services is rendered lain such
circumstances either on the rationale that the doctor has implied consent
fiom the patient to the emergency aid, or more accurately in my view, on
the rationale that the doctor is privileged by reason of necessity in giving
the aid and is not to be held liable for so doing.
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an action in battery.280Deficiencies in the consent process (e.g. a lack of adequate
information on which to make an informed choice ) which result in harm to the
patient may result in heafth care personnel being liable in negligence?'

This common law principle was considered in the psychiatric treatment context in
The

Fleming v.

-wa3

contained a provision that allowed

that the prior capable wishes of an involuntarily detained, incapable person could
be ovemdden on application by a physician to the Review ~oard.*" S. 35 (2)

stated:
Psychiatric and other related medical treatment shall not be given to
a patient,
where the patient is mentally competent, without the
(a)
voluntary, informed consent of the patient;
where the patient is not mentally competent,
(b)
without the consent of a person authorized by section 1
(i)
(a) to consent on behalf of the patient,
unless the review board has made an order authorizing
(ii)
the giving of the specified psychiatric or other related
medical treatment, or
(iii) unless a physician certifies in writing that there is
V-k

b g k (1980), 1 14 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 8- 1 1 (S.C.C.) (hereinaflerJXeibl),
supm note 279.
28'JteiM,
note 280 at 10-1 1,
v. W c t e r , [1993] 2 S.C.R.119,
100 D.L.R. (4'") 609 at 6 1 7 (cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter

m).

'82wÎmipo,s u p ~ ênote 65.

*%end H

u AcL R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, S. 35(2) (b) (ii).

imminent and serious danger to the life, a limb or a
vital organ of the patient requiting immediate
treatment and the physician believes that delay in
obtaining consent would endanger the life, limb or a
vital organ of the patient.
Two patients held involuntarily and deemed incapable to consent to treatment at
Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre had, when previously capable, made their
wishes not to be treated with psychotropic medications known. The Official
Guardian was appointed to act as these men's decision-maker. Following their
prior known capable wishes, as directed by the Act, the Officia1 Guardian refused

to consent to treatment with antipsychotics. The physician applied to the Board for
treatment permission as set out in S. 35 (2) of the Act. The Officia1 Guardian
challenged the constitutionality of this provision of the Mental H e a l t h ~ c t . ~ ' '

Although the two men, represented by the Officia1 Guardian, were unsuccessful at
trial, the decision was overtumed by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In its reasons,
the Court explicitly reinforced the cornmon law principle that no treatment was to

proceed without the consent of a capable person or his or her decision-maker:
The right to determine what shall, or shall not be done with one's
own body, and to be free from non-consensual medical treatment, is
a nght deeply rooted in our cornmon law. This nght underlies the
doctrine of informed consent. With vety limited exception, every
person's body is considered inviolate, and, accordingly, every

competent adult has the right to be fkee from unwanted treatment.
The fact that serious risks or consequences may result from a refusa1
of medical treatment does not vitiate the right of medical selfdetenninati~n.~'~
Since the Mental Act had legislated that the prior known capable wishes of
a now incapable person must be f ~ l l o w e d it
~ ~could
'
not also include provisions in

the Act to "...render those competent wishes, and the substitute's decisions based
thereon, entirely meaningless when a treatment order is sought fiom the review
board."288

The Court of Appeal held that the provisions of the Mental He&

Actg9

authorizing that an involuntary treatment incapable person's pnor capable wishes
could be overruled by an order of the Review Board violated s.7 of the Canadian
Charter of

266F~ew,

Freedoms2* and could not be saved by S. 1.

note 65 at 85.

"'wHe&k&L

R.S.O.1980, c. 262, S. 1 (a) (6).

x8m,
note 65 at 93.
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being Schedde B to the M

FreedpmS, Part 1of the -tmn
a Act 1982 (U-K)., 1982, c. 1 1.

. .

Act, 1982,

,

consent must be informed

b)

The Supreme Court in

v . 1 ~ p pheld
~ ~ 'that in order to provide informed

consent, a patient should be advised of the nature of the procedure to be
perfomed, any material risks, and any risks that might be specifically important to
the particular patient.292The Court aiso recognized that the physician should answer any
questions that the patient specifically put fonvard."

These requirements attempt to

balance the rights of persons to be informed while not imposing an arguably
impossible burden on physicians to disclose every side effect of a proposed
treatment that has ever been reported.

decided shortly after fIppp v. L

Reibl v. 94:-

M by ~the S.C.C.
~ ~reinforced
~

the principle that any matenal nsks and risks that might be of particular

significance to the patient must be disclosed by the physician. In addition, the
Court adopted a modified objective test in relation to causation:

...other aspects of the objective standard would have to be geared to
what the average prudent person, the reasonable person in the
patient's particular position, would agree to or not agree to, if al1
29'[1980]2 S.C.R. 192, 1 12 D.L.R. (3d) 67 (cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter
2

9

2

~

s ,y e ~ anote 29 1 at 8 1.

2wu
note 280.
295tlpep.
SYDE~note 291.

m).

material and special risks of going ahead with the surgery or
foregoing it were made known to hirn.

...............................................................................................

In short, although account must be taken of a patient's particular
position, a position that will Vary with the patient, it must be
objectively assessed in tenns of rea~onableness.~~
Recently the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated the principles regarding
inforrned consent set out in fLQpp v.

m297
and Beihl v. Huehes.298 In t-

v.

Srni&*" Justice Cory reviewed the importance of recognizing informed consent:

Jteibl v. Hunhes is a v e r -significant and leading authority. It marks
the rejections of the paternalistic approach to detennining how much
information should be given to patients. It emphasizes the patient's
right to know and ensures that patients will have the benefit of a hi&
standard of disclosure.

........................................................................................................

The Beibl v.
test has had the desired effect of ensuring that
patients have al1 the requisite information to make an informed
decision regarding the medical procedures they are ~ontemplating.~"

c)

consent may be withdrawn at any time

The Supreme Court of Canada in

. . .

v. -ctebM1

explicitly reinforced

2"Ed2L =l=
note 280 at 16-17.

''
no
'
te 29
a
1.
'98sypiIbnote 280.

2w(99(i997),148 D.L.R. (4*) 48 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter m).
3"')Jbid,at 56.

m.
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note 28 1.

that consent, once given, may be withdrawn. Justice Cory considered this
principle in light of the fundamental right of a person to control her own body:
It should not be forgotten that every patient has a right to bodily
integrity. This encompasses the right to determine what medical
procedures will be accepted and the extent to which they will be
accepted. Everyone has the right to decide what is to be done to
one's own body. This includes the right to be fkee fkom medical
treatment to which the individual does not consent. This concept of
individual autonomy is fhdamental to the common law and is the
basis for the requirement that disclosure be made to a patient. If
during the course of a medical procedure a patient withdraws the
consent to that procedure, then the doctor must halt the process. This
duty to stop does no more than recognize every individual's basic
right to make decisions conceming his or her own body.'02

d)

capable means possessing the ability to understand information and
appreciate the consequences of a decision or lack of a decision

Howlefl v. ~ a r u n a r a t i n eset
~~
out
~ the three elements required for proof of mental

capacity to consent to treatment:
To be "mentally competent" a person must:
(1) Have the ability to understand the nature of the iliness for
which treatment is proposed; and
(2) Have the ability to understand the treatment proposed, and
(3) Be able to appreciate the consequences of giving or

302W- e l l p ,
note 28 1 at 618-19. The Court did acknowledge that halting
sorne procedures midway through their course might resuit in life threatening or serious

problems for the patient. In these circurnstances, a doctor might be justified in
continuing. The Court also recognized that a detemination of whether a person was
capable at the time of withdrawing consent would have to be made.
"'(1 988), 64 O.R. (2d) 4 18 ( Dist. Ct.) (hereinafter Jiowle~).

These requirements were adopted by successive Ontario courts in-16

v. P e n e w e n e M e d H e u

O ' D ~ h e r t y , ~ ~ ~v.
Centre?)'' and

v.

v. St. T h o r n Psv-c

. .

Hospitêl .308 In Mc-

the Court

recognized that because of the patient's intelligence and her familiarity with
mental illness that came fiom witnessing the experiences of her mother, she was
able to recite information regarding mental illness and proposed treatments without
difficulty. However, because she did not believe she was ill, and this denial
formed part of her mental illness, the Court mled that she was incapable to make
treatment decisions: she could not apply her knowledge regarding mental illness
and treatment options to herse1f309 This requirement that the penon must

aclcnowledge the presence of a mental illness and be able to apply the knowledge
of proposed treatment or lack of treatment to himself or herself has been adopted

3 m J - I ~ ~ 1 e ~ , note 303 at 42 1-22.

305&f~I(iàYy

'=,

note 152.

S U P note
~ ~ 165.

"[l993], O.J. No. 3090 (C.J. (Gen. Div.)) (Q.L.) (hereinafter
'08(i992), 7 O R . (3d) 303 (hereinafter ahpp).
309pvl~r(iar,
supro note 152 at 23-24.

m).

by the courts i n m , 3Io ~ y l o ~' ': and
? -.)l2

e)

involuntary hospitaüzation and incapacity are not synonymous

Justice Robins in Flemine v. p a 3 "accknwledged that "[tlhe detemination of a
patient as voluntary or involuntary is independent of any assessrnent of a patient's
mental c~mpetency.""~He went on to state that:

...involuntary patients, including those who, like the appellants, are
being held pursuant to the Criminal Code, are taken to have the
capacity to decide for themselves whether or not to receive antipsychotic drugs. Until they are found incompetent, they hold the
sarne rights as any other competent patients in the facility. Indeed,
they hold the same rights as competent persons elsewhere in the
province whose consent m u t be obtained before they can be the
subject of medical treatrnent. Mentally il1 persons are not to be
stigrnatized because of the nature of their illness or disability; nor
should they be treated as persons of lesser stahis or dignity. Their
right to persona1 autonomy and self-detennination is no less
significant, and is entitled to no less protection, than that of
competent persons s u f f e ~ nom
g
physical ail ment^."^

note 1 65 at para. 14.

Iorn,

3' l

m

,

sypzg note 307 at para. 1 1.

ha^,

note 308 at 3 15.

"
)
,

3'4JbidL
at 78.

3'51bid.at 86-87.

note 65.

0

Co-aJ

Cornmitment status and incapacity to consent to treatment are two entirely
different matters. A person can be an informal, voluntary, or involuntary patient
in a psychiatric f a ~ i l i t y . ~Persons
'~
are either capable or incapable of making

treatment decisions. The & l e m t h Act. 196z317separated the criteria
necessary for involuntary admission and enquiries regarding treatment for the k s t
tirne. Successive mental health legislation and interpretation by the judiciary has
continued to delineate this separation. However, a patient's cornmitment status
and his capacity to consent to treatment do have incidental connections important
in determining whether treatment can be forced, even with valid consent fiom a
substitute decision-maker.

There are four categories of patients who may be resident in a psychiatric facility:
1)

2)
3)
4)

involuntarily cornmitted and capable of making treatment decisions;
voluntary and capable of making treatment decisions;
involuntarily cornmitted and incapable of making treatment decisions; and
voluntary and incapable of making treatment decisions.

The law is clear regarding what must happen (or not happen) with respect to the
first two categories of persons who refuse treatment. The law is not clear

should be noted that a person may also be detained under the
Code in a psychiatric facility but this situation will not be addressed in this thesis.
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regarding the third and fourth categories. In order to understand what effect a
patient's cornmitment status and capacity to consent to treatment may have on the
ability to force treatment, al1 combinations of capacity/incapacity and
voluntary/involuntary scenarios will be reviewed.

A)

involuntary and capable of making treatment decisions

This principle was set out clearly in Fle-

v.

w3''
If an involuntary, capable

patient, refüsing treatment, continues to meet the criteria for involuntary
committal, he must be detained. He cannot, however, be forcibly treated. Many
people, including psychiatrists like Dr. A.D. Milliken, fmd this situation
intolerable:
As a clinician 1 do not wish to be associated with restraint or
incarceration without any form of treatment. To confine someone
against their wishes because they are ill and yet not be able to
provide the treatment which 1 know will be beneficial c m only be
described as repugnant. 1 believe that the majority of society would
equally regard it ~0.'"

However, no matter what the majority of society, or Dr. Milliken, thinks, the Iaw is
clear that those capable of making treatment decisions must have those decisions
respected.

3'8Fleminn,~ l p note
~ i l 65.
3'g~harles
Pearson,"Consent to Psychiaîric Treatment in Canada--Specific Issues"
2:2 Health Law Review 3 at 14, citing Dr. A.D. Milliken, "The Uniform Mental Health
Act: A Clinician's Questions" (1987) 7 Health L. Can. 76 at 82.
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B)

voluntary and capable of making treatment decisions

A capable person is one whose decisions regarding treatment must be re~pected.~"

He may accept or refuse treatrnent. A voluntary patient must be discharged on
reque~t.'~'In the event that such a person disagreed with the treatment proposed

by the physician, she could leave hospital or seek to remain in hospital, but refuse
treatment. Involuntary treatment of a capable person is outside the law.

C)

involuntary and incapable of making treatment decisions

For treatrnent incapable penons, consent must be obtained fiom a substitute
decision-maker. If consent is obtained, and the patient then resists, for example, to

take his medications as ordered by mouth,)" they could be given by injection,

using restraint if necessary. This may be justified because consent has been
obtained for the treatment, and the restraint does not affect the person's abiiity to

320Reibl,anote 280.
"'AS noted earlier, although voluntary persons may ask to be discharged, many
hospitals have policies that dictate that any person asking for discharge must be
interviewed by a physician. In the event the physician finds that the person meets the
criteria for cornmitment, the physician may certify him under S. 20 (5).

'*'~tshould be noted that 1 am making several assumptions here in my illustration:
the consent m u t be infonned, the substitute decision-maker must be the person entitled

to give or refuse consent, and the necessary and appropriate orders must have been
obtained from the physician to give the medications by mouth, or, if refbsed, by injection.
Some medications, such as Lithium Carbonate (used in the treatment of manic
depression) and anti-depressants are not manufactured in injection form and therefore,
this scenario does not even arise.
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ask for her discharge: she is already being detained under the authority of the
M e n m t h

The question is, however, outside of the scope of this

thesis and I take no position on this matter. It is an untested area of the law.

D)

voluntary and incapable of making treatment decisions

According to the law in Ontario as it now stands, when a voluntary patient, who is
treatment incapable refuses to comply with treatment, restraint for the purposes of
treatment is pennissible iE
a)

b)

c)

a Power of Attorney for Personal Care exists with specific
authority to restrain and detain; or
no POAPC exists but the substitute decision-maker has a hl1
guardianship order nom the court; or
no POAPC exists but the substitute decision-maker has a
partial guardianship order fiom the court with specific
authority to restrain and detain.

If neither a), b) or c) exist, it is not pennissible to restrain a voluntary patient for
the purposes of treatment. Therefore, there will be some instances when treatment,
ordered by a physician and consented to by a substitute decision-maker, cannot be
administered to a voluntary, treatment incapable patient.

.

onclusion
The law regarding psychiatric hospitalization and capacity to make treatment

decisions in Ontario is modelled on a dangerousness standard for cornmittal and a
moderately liberal approach to capacity determination. Under the current
legislative scheme, a voluntary, treatment incapable patient cannot be restrained
for the purposes of treatment that has been ordered by her physician and consented
to by a substitute decision-maker, absent authority contained in a Power of
Attorney for Personal Care or a Guardianship Order . The existence of such
Powers of Attomey for Penonal Care, or Guardianship Orders, are not
~ornrnon.'~~
Therefore, the perplexing situation c m mise in which a voluntary
patient deemed incapable of making treatment decisions cannot be provided with

treatment considered to be in the best interests of the patient by both the health
care team and the patient's s m g a t e decision-maker. This is a situation resulting

fiom the current state of the law. The question that must now be addressed is
whether the state of the law is acceptable. Have we found the right balance
between promoting the well-being of mentally il1 individuals and protecting their
rights, or have we, in seeking to distance ourselves fiom the abuses of the past,

tilted too far in the direction of rights at too great a cost for well-being?

'"1 am making this statement based on my experience as a Registered Nurse on an
Acute Admitting Ward in a Provincial Psychiatrie Hospital. In my 1 3 years of practice 1

have never seen a patient admitted or treated under either of these two routes.

CHAPTER 3-ETHICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Introductiop
From the review of the current status of the law in Ontario regarding the ability to
force treatment on a voluntary, treatment incapable person that was carrïed out in
Chapter 2,1 believe that, absent a guardianship order with appropriate authority or
a Power of Attomey for Personal Care with a Ullysses type clause, the restraint

and subsequent detention of a voluntary, treatment incapable person is illegal.
Others may disagree with my interpretation of the law. However, it is at the very
least, a fair statement that the law in this regard is not settled and my research has
not located a single Canadian judgment on this issue.

Proceeding on my belief that the restraint and incidental detention of a voluntary,
treatment incapable person, absent the exceptions listed above and discussed in
Chapter 2, is illegal, an analysis of whether or not the law should permit the
involuntary treatment of a voluntary patient will now be undertaken. In this
Chapter 1 will set out arguments for and against pennitting the involuntary
treatment of voluntary patients.325In each instance, 1 will fust set out the argument
'*'It shodd be noted that throughout this Chapter 1 will be referring to the
"involuntary treatment of voluntary, incapable persons". In doing so 1 am speaking of the
group of persons who cannot be involuntarily treated, even despite substitute consent.
Persons with guardianship orders or Powers of Attomey for Personal Care with a Ullysses
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in the voice of those who would endorse the argument and then, under the heading
"Considerations", assess the argument.

S FOR PERbfJTTING THE-

1.
-

F VOCUNTqaY. T-TWNT

I
N
-

PERSONS
A)

The Law in Ontario Recoguizes that Incapable Persons Need Decisioos
Made for Them

The present law in Ontario has set out an elaborate scheme whereby a person

unable to make decisions regarding her treatrnent must have someone else consent
on her behalf. This scheme is based on two fiindamental beliefs. First, in law no
beneficial treatment is to proceed or be withheld without a valid c~nsent.~"A
valid consent or refisal is understood as a fiee and infonned consent or refusal
given by a person who understands the nature and significance of the decision
being made. Second, an incapable person rnay not appreciate the consequences

of giving or refusing consent."'

If he does not understand, his refusal of

treatment can prevent treatment and, in effect, an invalid refusa1 is being respected.
If a treatrnent incapable person's refusal of treatment is respected, then a decision
is being made by someone who may not be capable of understanding the nature

type clause are not included in this group.

'*6There are of course exceptions for emergency treatrnent. See p. 73.

327&&h Care Cons-,

S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 4 (1).
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and consequences of the decision. This flies in the face of contemporary infonned

consent theory.

This argument blurs the distinction between confinement and treatment.

Contemporary informed consent theory concems itself with treatment, not
confinement. The standard for hospitalization is dangerousness, not cornpetence.
Under current law, the voluntary patient c m walk out of the hospital. To permit
blocking passage out of the hospital would be to erase the distinction between
committal and treatment. Clearly, leaving the hospital would be exercising a
choice that would preclude treatment.

B)

Young children, who are incapable of making treatment decisions, are
restraioed by parents routinely in order to receive treatment

Many a parent has physically restrained a young child in order for procedures such
as booster shots, and medication to be administered to an unwilling, fearfbl child.
It is extremely unlikely that such restraint would be considered illegal. By

analogy, the restraint of mentally il1 adults for the purposes of treatment should be
legally permitted (assuming valid consent has been given by a substitute decisionmaker).

It is true that parents often restrain young children who are afhid of needles or
who do not wish to take medications such as antibiotics. They obviously ought to
have their decisions re medication respected. But what about the decisions
regarding restraint?

As pointed out in Chapter 2, it is my belief that any restraint that is incidental to

the delivery of a treatment that has been consented to by a substitute decisionmaker for a treatrnent incapable penon can be considered part of the treatrnent.
The defmition of "treatment" in S. 2 (1) of the Health Care Consent Act. 1996~''is
broad enough to include restraint. However, the difficulty arises in that the
restraint, although part of the treatment, results in an incidental detention of a
voluntary patient. Unless the substitute decision-maker has the authority also to
consent to the detention of the incapable person for the purposes of treatment, such
restraint is, in my belief, i l ~ e g a l . ' ~ ~

However, the treatment and restraint of children for the purposes of treatment can
be distinguished fiom the treatment and restraint of the mentally il1 . The common
"'S.O.

1996, c. 2, Sch. A.

12'See p. 92 for a summary of substitute decision-makers with authority to consent
to the detention of a treatment incapable person for the purposes of treatment.

law recognizes that parents are responsible for the care and custody of their
children. In

9

v.

-

s Aid Society of Mert~-~O
'

the

Supreme Court of Canada recognized the constitutional rights of parents to make
decisions for children who are in their custody. Justice LaForest stated:

...1 would have thought it plain that the right to numire a child, to
care for its development, and to make decisions for it in fbndamental
matters such as medical care, are part of the liberty interest of a
parent. As observed by Dickson J. in R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd.,
supra, the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum or absent a histoncal
context. The comrnon law has long recognized that parents are in
the best position to take care of their children and d e al1 the
..
ecisigns neceto ensure their well-being.
...............................................................................................................

..In recent years, courts have expressed some reluctance to interfere
with parental rights, and state intervention has been tolerated only
when necessity was demonstrated. This only serves to confirm that
the parental interest in bringing up, nurturing and caring for a child,
including medical care and moral upbringing, is an individual
interest of fundamental importance to our society .33 ' [emphasis
added]
Parents may restrain theù children in order to, for example, have them immunized
as such action can be characterized as in the best interests of the child. There is no
liberty issue at stake. However, within the context of treatment of persons with
mental illnesses, there is a liberty interest that should not be discounted. In fact,

330[1995],122 D.L.R.( 4 9 1.

"'
v.
~
dren s a
Aid Societv of Metrow)im Torom,
?

'

note 360 at

40-4 1. See also: &l~&
v.
(1972), 6 R.F.L. 180 (Ont. Prov. Ct.);
v.
(1 979), 25 0 . R (2d) 673 ( Prov. Ct.); and Ontario Department of Justice, Ministry of

Supply and Services, "Custody and Access: Public Discussion" (Toronto:Queen's
Printer, 1974) at 7.
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the legislation explicitly separates cornmitta1 and treatment issues recognizing this
distinction. There is no provision for the substitute decision-maker of a treatment
incapable person to make "al1 decisions necessary" as recognized by the common
law in terms of parental power.

C)

Assistance of Person to Potentially Achieve Optimal Quality of Life

Many persons with mental illnesses function very well in society. Often a part of
this success can be attributed to treatments used to control mental illnesses. A

voluntary, treatment incapable person who refuses to comply with a course of
treatment consented to by her decision-maker may be deprived of the opportunity
to achieve optimal wellness if involuntary treatment is not given.

While it is true that voluntary, treatment incapable patients may improve with
hospitalization, this can not be used as justification for detaining an incapable' but
not dangerous person.'j2 To rely on this to rationalize restraint for the purposes of
treatment is to undermine the entire committal standards.

33Wote:here 1 am referring to a person who does not meet the cornmitment
standards of S. 20 (5) of the MentaIAct, R.S.O.1990, c. M.7.

D)

Western Society values assisting others wbo are vulnerable or potential
victims of discrimination

Canada, unlike some other countries in the world, has in place a system
euphemistically referred to as a "social safety net". Many Canadians believe that
there is some obligation to assist others who fmd themselves in circumstances that

are less than optimal. As a result of this inclination to provide assistance, many
persons in Canadian society believe that the involuntary treatment of individuals
who cannot make that decision for themselves and are refusing to comply with

treatment would be the appropriate course of action. This belief would be in
keeping with the principle of beneficence; that is, the provision of assistance to
peeons in need.

As Justice Donald stated in McC-

v. Pirector of Riverview Hospital Review

Panel et aP":

...Canadians want to live in a society that helps and protects the
mentally il1 and that they accept the burden of care which has always
been part of our tradition.334
Since persons who are incapable of making treatment decisions are vulnerable
members of society, assistance must be rendered. Part of that assistance will corne
IÏom a substitute decision-maker. If consent is provided for treatment, that form of
993), 104 D.L.R.(4&) 391 (B.C.S.C.).

334~bid,
at 419.

assistance should be honored.

The distinction that drives the central problem in this thesis (committal versus
treatrnent) was introduced to combat discrimination and abuse of the vulnerable.

Persons with mental illnesses were often subjected to acts that are now considered
abuse, often by persons who felt they were acting with the patients'best interests in
mind.

On review it must be asked which was less discriminatory and harmfùl.

On the basis of the limited data we have, we must conclude that arguments in
favour of acting on the b a i s o f what many feel is the best interests of persons with
mental illnesses must faif.

E)

With treatment, some incapable persons may, in the future, be in a
position to exercise autonomous decision-making

Autonomy has been described as :
...people's interest in making significant decisions about their lives
for themselves, and according to their own values or conceptions of
a good life. It is by having our self-deterrnination respected by
others that we are able to exercise significant control and
responsibility for our lives."'

Autonomy is a highly pnzed concept in Western civilization. The ability to make

"'Dan W. Brock "Good Decision Making for Incompetent Patientsy'(1994) 6
Hastings Center Report (Special Supplement) S8 at S9.
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choices about one's own life and to have them respected is central to the concept
of who one is and the very basis of personal fieedom. Persons who are treatrnent
incapable, by definition, are not fùlly autonomous.

Treatment may Uicrease a

mentally il1 persan's autonomy. Therefore, the involuntary treatrnent of a
treatment incapable person could be autonomy enhancing. In light of the
emphasis that is placed on the ability to make decisions for oneself, the involuntary
treatment of a person with a mental illness, with the goal of having that person
potentially come to a position where he can make autonomous choices, should be
an important consideration in favour of involuntary treatment.

Considerations

This is an argument that cannot be discounted. If it is possible that the person
could come to the place, after treatrnent, where she was competent to exercise her
autonomy and make decisions regarding her own life, this would be extremely
positive. However, we need to distinguish voluntary, treatment incapable patients
who are capable with respect to decisions that affect their liberty. For those who

are capable in this respect, restraint for the purposes of treatment is a violation of

their current autonomy. It would be hard to justify such an inningement for a
potential füture enhancement of autonomy.

1O3

In addition, it should be noted that some persons, even despite treatment, will

never be in a position to exercise autonomy. For these patients, this argument
fails.

F)

Effort should be made to alleviate the potential suffering of persons
with mental ülnesses whenever possible

There have been many personal accounts regarding the psychic pain, and

sometimes physical stressors, that accornpany psychiatric illnesses. Some persons
are disoriented to tirne, place or person. Some are so depressed they cannot eat,
sleep or, in extreme cases, move h m one spot. Persons who exhibit manic
symptoms may go for days without eating or sleeping, sometimes making
extravagant purchases that bankmpt their families. Hallucinations may lead
persons with illnesses such as schizophrenia to harm themselves or to hear voices
telling them what worthless people they are. To allow a voluntary, treatment
incapable person to continue in such a state, especially in light of the fact that by
defmition he cannot appreciate the consequences of giving or refusing consent to
treatment, appears to be an abdication of the responsibility of those of us in society
with the ability to exercise judgment in such situations to end such suffering. It

could also be characterized as pennitting suffering in spite of means available to
alleviate such suffering.

This is perhaps one of the most compelling arguments in favour of involuntary
treatment of voluntary, incapable patients. it is particularly troubling to know that
a persons' situation could be improved, sometirnes dramatically, if treatment was
provided. Relatives and health care providers are often in the position of having
witnessed the penon in previous sirnilar episodes when treatrnent was given and
improvement followed. Therefore, they know îhat the person's symptoms could
be reduced or eliminated.

G)

Alleviatioa of anguish of relatives and friends who must watch persoo
remain il1 witbout the provision of treatment

Friends and relatives experience rnuch distress watching their loved ones
experience the symptoms and behaviours associated with mental illness. This is
particularly the case when the person does not meet the cnteria for involuntary
committal but leads a life punctuated by constant hallucinations, poor self care and
chronic shelter difficulties. A relative is oAen the substitute decision-maker for

such a person. Once consent is provided, according to the guidelines set out in the
Health Care Consent Act. 1996,"~
the substitute decision-maker is often relieved
to think that treatment will be given. It is a harsh blow to learn that no treatment

3 3 6 ~1996,
. 0 .c. 2, Sch. A: decisions mut be made by a substitute in accordance
with pnor known wishes made whiie comptent or best interests (S. 21).
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can be given, despite consent, to a voluntary, treatment incapable person who
refuses to CO-operate. The alleviation of this stressor for the relatives and fiiends
of persons who refuse to comply with treatment, despite consent, would be

bene ficial.

It is particularly difficult to watch someone in distress a d o r a state of less than
optimal functioning when one knows that there could be improvement with the
administration of treatment. Relatives, fkiends and health care providen often find
themselves in the position of 'Watching fkom the sidelines" while the patient
refuses to accept treatment. However, again, it rnust be remembered that the
mental health legislation has been constructed to attempt to achieve balances
between competing rights and to ensure that protections are put in place whereby

abuses of the past will not reoccur. The stress on family and fiiends cannot be
taken into account in this balancing. This is not to Say, however, that these stresses
should be ignored. Alternative methods of relief ought to be sought.

H)

Protection of Membek of Society from Potentiai Future Harms

Persons with mental illnesses that are left untreated may, in the future, have their
symptoms exacerbate. This exacerbation may lead them to h m others in the

1O6

community. In addition, a voluntary, treatment incapable penon with a mental
illness may have her symptoms exacerbate to the point that the risk of harm to self
or others is so great that she needs to be committed. Minimal restraint used now is
justified to prevent the need for greater restraint in the fùture.

First, it must be remembered that persons who pose a danger to others can be
committed. Therefore, there is no increased harm to others in the comrnunity.

Second, statistics reveal that it is only a small number of persons with mental
illnesses in the comrnunity who will potentially harm themselves or othen:
% of Canadian adult population who are seriously mentally il1
(e.g. schizophrenia, psychopathic (antisocial personality

disorder), manic-depressive (bipolar disorder), severely
depressed or suffering fiom panic disorder or obsessivecompulsive behaviour):
2.8% (or 846,000 persons)
estimated number of Canadians with severe mental illness
who are not institutionalized and are a potential danger to
27,000 to 54,000337
themselves or others:
It should be noted that the above statistics include persons who will h m

337~ichael
Valpy, "Mental Illness: Cleaning out the Cuckoo's Nest7' The Globe
and M d (7 March 1998) D 1, citing statistics compiled nom the Ontario Medical
Association, Ontario Ministry of Health, Don Jail (Toronto), Clarke Institute of
Psychiatry (Toronto), Daily Telegraph (London), Queen Street Mental Health Centre
(Toronto).
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themselves andor others. The nurnber of persons with a mental illness in the
cornmunity who are a threat to others (e.g. not just to thernselves) will be even
lower.

The fear that al1 persons with mental illnesses are dangerous can be described as
"sanism:"
'Sanism' is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character
of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in )
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexisrn, homophobia, and ethnic
bigotry.

.................................................*...................*.........................................
.....based largely upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and

deindividuaiization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of
false 'ordinary cornmon sense .338
9

As c m be seen from the above, there is no certainty that persons with mental
illnesses will be dangerous, and infiingements on their liberty must be done with
the acknowledgrnent that this prejudice may be unjustly influencing decisions

cloaked in beneficence.

I)

Reduction of coaflict for health care professionals

The inability to provide treatment that is clinically recognized as being beneficial
in alleviating symptoms of mental iliness is a cause of stress and fhstration for

'"~ichael L. Perlin "Decodîng the Right to Rehise Treatment Law"(1993) 16
International Journal of Law & Psychiatry 15 1 at 170.
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health care providers. Many enter their profession with the desire to effect change
and "help people". When presented with a voluntary, treatment incapable person
who resists treatment and who by iaw the health care provider cannot force to have

treatment, many feel impotent and question the basis of their career choice.

A situation such as that described above may result in "moral di~tress."~~'
This

phenornenon has been descnbed as follows:
Moral distress occurs when moral choices cannot be translated into
moral action. For nurses, moral distress is common. It arises when
situational constraints make them feel unable to implement their
moral choices for their patients. This distress is associateci with
feelings of guilt, anger, fnistration and powerlessness. Moral
distress appears to be an important constituent of nurse's stress and
burnout.340

Being a health care provider in a psychiatrie facility in Ontario in the 1990s is an
extremely difficult job. There are stressors that confiont such individuals at every

turn. However, feelings of impotence and stress in situations such as voluntary,
treatment incapable persons refising to comply with treatment despite appropriate
substitute consent cannot be used alone as a justification for advocating the ability
339Patricia
Rodney and Rosalie Starzomski "Constraints on the Moral Agency of
Nurses" (1 993) 89 (9) Canadian Nurse 24.
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to force treatment in such situations. Giving such weight to these feelings would
be inappropriate, since the prirnary focus should be on the patient. Consideration
of the impact of this situation on health care providers, similar to the situation of
members of the patient's family or group of fnends, should not be discounted, but
neither should it be determinative. Alternative means of dealing with the feelings
that accompany the refusal of treatment by a voluntary, treatment incapable patient
should be sought.

A)

Undermining a system desiped to maximue the protection of and
respect for the various interests of persons with mental illnesses

The system regarding committal and treatment of persons with mental illnesses in

Ontario has been changed repeatedly over the last two centuries. Many of those
changes, as reviewed in Chapter 1, were put in place to recognize that persons with
mental illnesses had been subject to abuses and had very few protections available

to them. In order to prevent m e r abuses and in recognition of the fact that the
justifications for involuntary confuiement are distinct from those for involuntary
treatment, the issues of comrnittal and treatment were separated: the standards are
different and the decision-makers are different.

110

Today in Ontario a person can be detained in a psychiatric facility if he or she
meets criteria set out in theht-

Act."'

Absent being a danger to self,

danger to others, or exhibiting an inability to care for oneself that would result in
imminent and senous impairment, a person cannot be invoiuntarily detained under
the Mental Health Act. To allow restraint for the purposes of involuntary

treatrnent would be to blur this distinction. Consider, for example, a person who is
addicted to alcohol or other dmgs. Pari of the treatment of the addiction might be
confinement to a controlled environment in which the drugs would not be
available. In other words, involuntary confuiement in a psychiatric hospital. This
could be fiarned as restraint for the purposes of treatment. Yet it is no different
than involuntary hospitalization.

To endorse the involuntary treatment of a voluntary, treatment incapable person
would nulliw a system that has been created to set apart committal criteria tiom
treatment decisions. In actual fact, such a melding of the two would efTectually
undercut the present philosophy behind the mental health legislation that exists in

Ontario today .

11 1

B)

Places too mucb power in the hands of substitute decision-makers

Should substitute decision-makers be allowed to consent to the detention of the
incapable person for the purpose of treatment, outside of the authority contained in
a guardianship order, or a Power of Attorney for Personal Care with a Ullysses

type clause, they would arguably, in effect, have similar powers to detain that have
currently been given only to physicians under the M
e-4.342

However,

there are no procedural protections in place to ensure that any such decisions
would be reviewed. Unlike guardianship orders which have been granted afier

court involvement, or a Power of Attorney for Personal Care that has been

executed by the person while capable, and subject to strict procedural
requirements,343the decision of a substitute in these circumstances would go
unchecked. Such power over another, absent protections, would be at odds with a
system that has been designed to ensure that persons with mental illnesses are not
again subjected to abuse of power by others and their various interests are

appropriately balanced against each other.

Conclusion

While there are compelling reasons to consider instituting changes that would
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result in the ability to involuntanly treat al1 voluntary, treatment incapable persons
who have had treatment consented to by a substitute decision-maker, it is my
position that the reasons against instituting such changes outweigh the reasons for
doing so.

The question that remains is whether there are any options that might be pursued to
alleviate the difficulties associated with the dificult situation of a voluntary,

treatment incapable patient resisting treatment other than legislative reform
directed at permitting involuntary treatment of treatment incapable voluntary

patients. In Chapter 4 1will review such suggestions, rejecting some and adopting
others.

CaGfTER 4-ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE
PROBLEM
Introduction
A number of legislative changes have been suggested to deal with the problem of

voluntary, treatrnent incapable patients, who resist taking medication by mouth, or
to comply with other treatments. Such changes include broadening the current
cornmitment criteria, increasing the authority of substitute decision-makers, andor
legislating that al1 voluntary patients be capable to consent to treatment and
admission. In addition, some might suggest an application to the court to exercise
its p a r a

power would be appropriate in this situation. Each of these

possibilities will be reviewed, and the reasons for and against such courses of
action will be evaluated.

Ultimately, it is my belief that al1 of the suggested legislative changes are
inappropriate responses to the problem. Additionally, 1 do not believe that
appealing to the court under its

mtria~
jurisdiction would be appropriate or

successfül. However, 1 will not conclude that nothing can or should be done.
Rather, 1 will argue that education of health care personnel, farnily, niends and
lawyers regarding the powers of the legislation currently in effect is necessary. As
Michael Bay pointed out "...we have a crisis in misapplication of the treatment
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r ~ l e s . "1~believe
~ ~ that the law is sufficiently broad, when understcod and applied
correctly, to achieve the correct balance between the competing considerations
outlined in the previous chapter.

In addition to implementing education regardhg the powen of the current

legislation, 1 will argue that the increased and improved use of advance directives
should also be supported. A person who has periods of capacity can empower her
substitute decision-maker to have her detained and treated during a future period
of i n c a p a ~ i t ~ With
. ~ * ~adequate procedural safeguards, the use of such advance
~ " ~could reduce the number of persons who
directives has many a d ~ a n t a g e s , and
subsequently become incapable of making treatment decisions but cannot be
involuntarily treated under the current legislative scheme.

1.

Chawes to the Current Mental Heath Lgislation

A)

The Commitment Criteria

Commitment criteria can be divided into three main categories:
1)
2)

the need for treatment;
modified need for treatrnent (sometimes referred to as the

~~~~~

344

Bay,

note 16 at 126.
Act- 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30,

"%ee p. 13 1.

S.

50.

3)

"hybrid" r n ~ d e l ) ; ~
and
~'
bodily harm or physical dangerousne~s.~~~

Ontario's law regarding civil cornmitment is based on a dangerousness standard.

In order to be involuntarily detained or admitted to a psychiatrie facility in Ontario,
one must have a mental iliness and pose a danger to self, danger to others, or
exhibit an inability to care for oneself that will result in imminent serious or
physical i r n p a i ~ m e n t . ~ ~ ~

It might be argued that a solution to the problem of a treatment incapable voluntas.

patient resisting treatment is the broadening of the cornmitment cnteria to include
treatment incapable patients needing treatment. However, a number of arguments

can be made against this potential solution.

a)

Unjustified assumption

To see broadening the cornmitment criteria as enabling the involuntary treatment
of treatment incapable individuals is to assume that involuntary patients can be

restrained for the purposes of treatrnent. However, as stated earlier in this thesis, it

3'7The "modified need for treatment" mode1 is a cornmitta1 standard that contains
elements of both the need for treatment and a bodily h m or dangerousness criterion.
3 4 a M ~ C ~ r ~note
, 333 at 407-408 (citing expert testimony of Dr.John
Gray). See dso Reich,
note 15 at 419.
3 4 9 ~ e @Heath &,R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7,S. 15 (1) and 20 (5).

is not clear that this assumption is true.

b)

Minimal impairment

Broadened cornmitment criteria may result in

mso
violations in that the

restrictions on liberty do not pass the minimal impairment test in S. 1. Ontario
already has one of the highest rates of institutionalization in the ~ o r l d . ~ 'Relaxing
'
the commitment criteria to a mode1 based on the need for treatrnent to prevent
significant deterioration will potentially result in the increased involuntary
detention of persons with mental illnesses. As Pierce identified, after studying the
broadening of Washington's cornmitment criteria to include danger to self or
others, danger to property, and/or those gravely disabled, an increase in the total
number of involuntary admissions re~ulted.'~'

The seriousness of the loss of liberty that occurs as a result of involuntary

commitment in a psychiatrie facility cannot be underestimated:

. .

1 of the Constitution Act. 19&2,king Schedule B to the -da
(U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1.

351Bloomand Bay,

Act 1982

note 13 1 at 7.

'"Gien L. Pierce, Mary L. Durham and William H. Fisher " The Impact of
Broadened Civil Cornmitment Standards on Admissions to State Mentai Hospitals"
(1 985) 142: 1 American Journal of Psychiatry 104 at 1 07. It shouid be noted that Pierce
went on to state that he believed that more community senrices would have accomplished
the same result (providing care for those persons in need) but was not initiated because
involuntary commitment was cheaper.

[clommitment raises serious ethical concems. It involves depriving
persons of their fieedom for days, weeks, or longer, usually by
incarcerathg them in a locked psychiatric facility."'
Because of this deprivation of liberty, comrnitment criteria should be narrow,
rather than broad. This principle was recognized by the Manitoba Court of Appeal

. .

in Thwaites v. w t h Sciences C e m e Psych~tncFac

m." n

e Court held that

,~~~
Manitoba's cornmitment criteria, based on a need for treatment r n o ~ i e llacked
objective

rite ria.''^ Justice Philp stated:

...1 do not think it can be said that, in the absence of a
'dangerousness' or like standard, the provisions impair as little as
possible on the right of a person 'not to be arbitrarily
detained' .....provisions strike the wrong balance between the liberty
of the individual and the interests of the community. In the absence
of objective standards, the possibility of compulsory examination
and detention hangs over the heads of al1 persons suffering fkom a
mental disorder, and the availability and suitability of alternative and

353Rei~h,
S U P note
~ ~ 15 at 4 1 8.
3"[1988] 3 W.W.R. 2 li(hereinafler T h w a i t ~ .)
3ssSs.9 (1) and 15 (1) of Manitoba Mental Heath Act. R.S.M. 1970, c. M 110
stated:

9 (1) Where a duly qualified medical practitioner issues a medical certificate to
the effect that he has examined the person therein, and that the person should be confïned
as a patient at a psychiatnc facility, the person may be admitted to a psychiatric facility as
a compulsory patient.
S.

s. 15 (1) Where any person in Manitoba is or is suspected or believed to be in the
need of examination and treatrnent in a psychiatric facility and the person refhses to be
medically examined for the purpose of detennining his mental condition, any person may
apply to a magistrate or a provincial judge for an order compelling the person to be
medically examined.
3MThw&

note 354 at 229.

less restrictive forms of treat~nent.~"
In support of his ruling, Justice Philp cited the comments of Justice OYSullivan

(dissenting) in m v . GJobennan:"'
1 think the concept of mental illness is an elastic one; great care must
be taken that, while properiy upholding legislation to assist and
protect those pesons who are disturbed in their mental or emotional
processes, we must not allow legislahws and administrators to
impose more restriction on liberty than is reasonably necessary. 1
think the test for determinhg whether restriction is necessary must
be much more narrow than the test constituted by good faith
perception of govemment authorized psychiatrists that the 'welfare'
of a patient requires compulsory detention or treatment.

...*................................................*...........-..........................................

...compulsory detention should be restricted only to cases where it
can fairly be said that there is substantial danger to the prospective
patient or other~.''~
Statements such as those above reinforce the principle, enunciated in
litigation, that if a right is to be i n h g e d , it must be done so in the least restrictive
rnar~.ner.~~
Broadening the cornmitment criteria as suggested, arguably does not do
so. It is overbroad insofar as it captures even those patients who are not resisting
treatment. Furthennore, the burdedbenefit ratio is not favourable as many

"'Thwait~, SU PI^ note 356 at 230-3 1.

358(1986)27 D.L.R. ( 4 9 583 (Man. C.A.) (hereinafter

"-,

m).

ylprp note 358 at 590.

-,
[1986] 1 S.C.R.103; Ford v. Ouebe~,[1988] 2 S.C.R.712; &
. .
Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R.199; B4SS v. New BilbllS-3çkSEhQol Dlsmct No,
fi,[1996] 1 S.C.R.825.
v.

V.
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individuals will have their liberty restrained in order to facilitate the involuntary
treatment of a few.

While it is disturbing for many people, particularly family members and health
care personnel, when the above situation occurs, it is this rny belief that, in
actuality, it occurs infrequently.

"'

This belief is based on the fact that most

voluntary, incapable patients do not resist the treatment that has been ordered by
their physician and authorized by their substitute decision-rnaker. Statistically,

only about 10% of al1 psychiatrie patients refuse treat~nent.'~~
The sub-percentage
of those patients who are voluntary and incapable will be small. As Cleveland
concluded, in relation to the dangerousness mode1 of civil cornmitment:

...the literature provides little support for the belief that current legal
standards of cornmitment severeiy constrain psychiatrists who are
confronted with patients in serious need of treatment ....................
..............................................................................................................

No doubt some cases do occur in which psychiatrists feel
unavoidably constrained by commitment statutes. These wrenching

3 6 ' ~ hbelief
is
is based solely on my persona1 experience. In my 13 years as a
Registered Nurse at St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, 12 of which were spent on the most
active admitting unit, 1 have witnessed this occurrence only four times. The Ministry of
Heaith keeps no statistics on this situation, only the numbers of voluntary versus
involuntary patients. Neither St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, Whitby Psychiatric
Hospital, or Queen Street Mental Health Centre collect data regarding the incidence of
such occurrence.
362MichaelMcCubbin and David N. Weisstub "Towards A Pure Best Interests
Model of Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent Psychiatric Patients" (1988) 2 1:1
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1 at 17.

situations, which probably leave deep and lasting impressions on the
hospital staff, are most likely to be remembered as representative
cases more for their distinctiveness than their prevalence. They may
be considered a major concem mostly because of their ciramatic
quality rather than their actual n u m b e r ~ . ' ~ ~

The broadening of cornmitment criteria in order to rectify the situation where
voluntary, treatment incapable penons cannot be involuntarily treated, could
potentially result in the deprivation of liberty for a much larger number of
individuals than is currently the case. The inningement of the liberty interests of
many, to address the inability of physicians to currently force treatrnent on a few,
would fail the minimal impairnent requirement for limits on Charter rights.

c)

Potential abuse

Broadening the cornmitment criteria in the way suggested blurs the distinction
between comrnittal and treatrnent and renders mentally il1 patients vulnerable to
abuse. Early Ontario legislation permitted involuntary hospitalization to a
psychiatric facility simply because one was diagnosed with a mental i l l n e s ~ . ) ~
Subsequent acts required that the person have a mental illness and require care in a

363~arah
Cleveland, Edward P. Mulvey, Paul S. Appelbaurn and Charles W.Lidz
"Do Dangerous-Onented Laws Restrict Hospitalization of Patients Who Need
Treatment? A Test" (1 989) 40:3 Hospital & Community Psychiatry 226 at 270.
360

Acg S.O. 185 1, c. 82, S. 3;

Ac&
for ,
S.O. 1870-71,C. 18,S.
f t i n n v - of m e Persom, R.S.O. 1887,
c. 245,s.7 ; T h e H o s p i t n l s f o r ~ A c ? , R . S . O1914,c.295,s.8.
.
CS

S.O. 1853,c. 188,S. 7; - cA
5 ; An Act R e s D e
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psychiatrie fa~ility.'~'Under these very broad requirements for committal, many

persons were deprived of their liberty and ultimately were the recipients of very
intrusive procedures. These procedures were perfonned in the narne of treatment?
often with the best of intentions fiom well-meaning phy~icians,'~~
sometimes with

consent, and sometimes without.

Hospitalization and treatrnent were not separated until the recent past; in fact,
treatment was not even separately mentioned in the legislation until 1 9 3 5 . ~ ~In'
1967 the Me&

He& Act, 1967368separated the criteria for cornmitta1 fiom

issues surrounding treatment. Should Ontario broaden the cornmitment criteria to
a need for treatment model, or some variation of the need for treatrnent model, the
distinction between committal and hospitalization will once again be blurred.

Some people may scoff at predictions of potential abuse of powers and
infnngements on the rights of persons with mental illnesses in the modem age.
However, examples of misuse of power continue. The homfic deeds of Dr. Ewen

365

Act, S.O. 1950, c. 229, S. 20 (2).

'%ee Chapter 1.

1tai.s Ac& S.O. 1935, c. 39, S. 15.

368S.0.1967, c. 5 1.
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Cameron took place as recently as the 1 9 5 0 s . ~Michael
~~
Bay, Chair of Ontario's
Consent and Capacity Board, revealed that in 1996 a physician, upset with a
political figure, attempted to use the authority granted by the M e n u l t h

AC^^^^

to have the person detained for psychiatnc e~arnination.~~'
The medical director at
Riverview Hospital in British Columbia, after a critical accreditation comment,
was able to reduce the number of involuntary comrnittals nom over 90% to 60% in

two years using the same Iegislative criteria that was available previously when
more persons with mental illnesses were involuntarily detained. In Ontario, one
psychiatrie facility discharged 90% of their involuntary patients just prior to

review by the Consent and Capacity Board.372These exarnples indicate that the
potential for abuse, directed towards persons with mental illnesses, continues to be
present. Broadening the cornmitment criteria, reminiscent of the early statutes

regarding persons with mental illnesses in Ontario, would allow physicians to
detain more persons, thus increasing the potential for abuse.

3 6 9 ~ eChapter
e
1, pages 20 and 26.
370R.S.0.1990, c. M.7.
37'Bay,

note 16 at 124.

3fZm.
at 126.

d)

Misplaced decision-making authority

The current M e d - ~ t f ~ ~

empowers physicians to involuntarily detain and

admit penons who are a danger to themselves, to others, or exhibit an inability to
care for them~elves."~Substitute decision-makers (not physicians) are empowered

to make treatrnent decisions. This division of authority is grounded in a belief that
physicians are best situated to determine dangerousness3" and substitute decisionmakers (e.g. family members of the incapable person) are best situated to
determine best interests or prior wishes. To broaden the cornmitment criteria is to
give physicians the authority to make best interests judgments. There is, however,
the need to recognize that physicians are not in the best position to determine if

treatment is in keeping with the goals and values of the patient's life.376 They are
not situated nor have the expertise to make such judgments since these are moral
(value-based) and not only medical judgments.

3

7

4

Heal-,
~

~

R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, ss. 15 (1) and 20 (5).

375Eventhis has been criticized: see JvIcCo&&
note 333 at 408; Reich,
note 15 at 422 and Curt R. Batol, "Parens Patriae: Poltergeist of Mental Health
Law" (1 98 1) 3:2 Law & Policy Quarterly 191 at 193.
'"~ichael A. Jones, "Patients Who Refuse to Consent to Treatment: The Legal
and Ethical Response" (1995) Health Law Review 17; Donald H. J. Hermann
"Autonomy, Self-Determination, The Right of Involuntarily Committed Persons to
Refuse Treatment and the Use of Substituted Judgement in Medication Decisions
Involving Incompetent Persons" (1 990) 13:4 International Journal of Law & Psychiatry
361 at 383-84; Reich,
note 15 at 1268.

B)

Increasing the Power of the Substitute Decision-Moker

It might be suggested that the legislation be expanded to give al1 substitute

decision-makers the power to authorize restraint for purposes of involuntary
treatment of treatrnent incapable persons. However, there are several reasons that
this suggestion is unacceptable.

a)

Blurs the distinction between committal and treatment

Enabling al1 substitute decision-makers to authorize restraint for the purposes of
treatment would blur the distinction between cornrnittal and treatment and would
lead back towards a mental health system where one penon made the majority of
decisions about both admission and treatrnent. In 1967 the Ontario legislature
separated the criteria for admission and questions regarding treatment3" The
capacity to make decisions regarding treatment, and the criteria for holding a
person with a mental ilhess involuntarily, are two very discrete issues. This
position is now clearly enunciated in law.)" Legislating increased power to the
substitute decision-maker, to authorize restraint for the purposes of treatment, in
spite of voiced objection, could threaten to erode or at least, impinge on this
distinction.

377-t

'''Eleminn,

1967, S.O. 1967, c. 5 1.

note 65; I<han, yipta note 308.
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b)

Absence of procedural protections

Giving more power to substitute decision-makers in respect to treatment incapable
patients will blur the distinction between committal and treatment. Persons who
lose their liberty through the comrnittal process have access to challenge this
process through an application to the Consent and Capacity ~ o a r d . "Extending
~
power to a substitute decision-maker to authorize the restraint, and consequential
loss of liberty, of a treatment incapable voluntary patient in order to force

treatrnent, would be outside of the procedural protections currently in place.

There is potential for abuse of persons with mental illnesses by those who have the
power of making treatment decisions in their stead or who may have a vested
interest in having the person remain hospitalized. If the legislation was changed to
include the authority for al1 substitute decision-makers to authorize restraint in a
psychiatrie facility, coupled with the power already possessed to consent to

invasive treatrnents, the potential for abuse would be increased.

C)

Require that Voluntary Patients be Capable of Consenting to
Admission

Currently in Ontario there is no requùement that a person must be capable to be
admitted or to continue as a voluntary patient. In Manitoba the W
â
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hAct., R.S.O. 1990, C. M.7,
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39.
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specifically recognkes that voluntary patients must be competent to consent

to admission:

When a psychiatnst examines a person under subsection (1) and is of
the opinion that

....................................................................................

the person is not suitable to undergo a psychiatric
admission other than as an involuntary patient because
the person refuses or lacks the capacity to consent to
voluntary admission;
the psychiatrist may admit the person as an involuntary patient of the
psychiatric facility by completing and filing with the medical officer
in charge a certificate of involuntary admission in the form
prescribed by the reg~lations.~"

(b)

Similarly, Prince Edward Island also requires that al1 voluntary patients be capable
of consenting to admission.382However, Ontario and the remaining jurisdictions in

Canada do not specifically require capacity to consent to psychiatnc admission.

Several jurisdictions in Canada, including Ontario, do include a stipulation that a

"'w
H
e Act, S.M. 1991-92, c. 4, S. 16 (1.1).
'%ee Jbfend HeS.P.E.I. 1994, c. 39, S. 13 (1) (b) which states:
A psychiatrist who has received an application for an involuntary
psychiatric assessrnent of a person under subsection 6 (1) and who has
assessed the person may confhm the admission of the person as an
involuntary patient of the psychiatric facility by completing and filing with
the administrator a certificate of involuntary admission in the fonn
prescribed by the regulations if the psychiatrist is of the opinion that the
person

......................................................................................

(b) is rehising or is unable to consent to voluntary admission.

person may be involuntarily committed if he or she is "...net suitable for admission

or continuation as an informal or voluntary patient."'"

Bloom and Bay offer the

following interpretation of what "not suitable for continuation as an informa1 or
voluntary patienty'may mean:

The inclusion of the second requirement in S. 20 (5)
&&b Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.71 suggests that Uivoluntary
admission may be viewed as a last resort. While the Act does
not explain what it means to be suitable for admission as an
informal or voluntary patient, this requirement clearly is not
satisfied if the person refuses to be admitted as a voluntary
patient.
In addition, the requirement may not be satisfied if the person
requires fiequent restraint or seclusion, or if u t u r e of thc
wrson's m
or her consent to
sion c m o t be rel ed on. [emphasis added]'"

There has been no case law regarding what "not capable to consent to admission"
might mean. Therefore, to date in Ontario, there is no clear requirement that a

person must be capable of consenting to admission or continuation as a voluntary
patient in a psychiatric facility.

Since capacity to consent to admission and capacity to consent to treatment are

"'m

~e&&
R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7,S. 20 (5) (b). See also Mental He&
&,S.Y.1989-90, c. 28, S. 13 (1) (b); An Act to
M e n a Hedth Act, S.N.B.
1993, c. 59, S. 8.1 (1); and=Act, S.A. 1988, c. M-13.1, S. 2.

'"Bloom and Bay, SYPI& note 13 1 at 125.
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entirely distinct categories, the suggestion that al1 voluntary patients must be
capable to consent to admission does not dissolve the problem of voluntary,

treatment incapable patients refiuing treatment.

D)

Requiring that Voluntary Patients be Capable of Consenting to
Treatment

Should al1 voluntary patients be required to be capable of consenting to treatment
there would be no place for those persons who were incapable of making treatment

decisions and who did not meet the comrnitment criteria. Cornmitment and
treatment are two distinct enquiries. There would be no place in Ontario's current
mental health system for those persons. Similady, voluntary, treatment incapable
persons who were complying with treatrnent that had been consented to by their

substitute decision-rnaker would also have no legislative place in the current
Ontario mental health system.

Mile it is true that the potential for abuse of voluntary, incapable persons may
exist, separate mechanisms to address the needed protections for this category of

persons with mental illnesses should be investigated, rather than mandating that al1
voluntary patients must be capable to consent to treatrnent.

IL

O

*

*

O

se of the Court's P a r e m m a e J~agdictiop

The Court also has the authority, under its pareu

jurisdiction, to make

decisions for those person who are incapable and need protection. This
longstanding power of the Court was discussed at length by Justice LaForest in &

Ev~.~''In that case the Court declined to endorse the sterilization of an
incompetent young woman at the request of her mother. The Court held that while
it had the authority to make decisions based on its parens p

e power, it declined

to do so because, in this case, the surgical procedure was not proposed for the

incompetent person's therapeutic benefit but as a means of birth control which
would have eased the girl's mother's concems regarding an unwanted pregnancy
and her potential responsibilities for any child that would have resulted.

While the Court may still exercise its p_are~~

power today, in the

circumstances of a voluntary, treatrnent incapable person who resists treatment that
has been consented to by a substitute decision-maker, the Mental Health legislation
provides a complex scheme for court-appointed guardians and ousts the court's
parens patriae jurisdiction . Therefore, it is my belief that applications to the court
in this type of situation for the court to exercise its pxens patriw power will not be

'"(1 986) 3 1 D.L.R. (4&) 1 (S.C.C).
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IJse of SpecificFoims of Advance D

Advance directives allow persons who are capable to appoint a representative and
to clearly set out instructions for fiiture periods of incapacity. In the circumstances
of mental illness, many people have periods of capacity, followed by periods of

incapacity. These fluctuations often are comected to the disease process.

Persons with a mental illness could execute an advance directive that could
empower their substitute decision-maker with the authority to have them admitted,

detained and restrained in the event they become incapable and refuse treatment.
" m e House of Lords has very recently had the opportunity to d e on a case
regarding a voluntary, treatment incapable individual who was a patient in a psychiatrïc
faciIity. In Re L. ( B o snext fiend G&J, [1998] H.L.J. No. 24 (Q.L.), the House of
Lords ruled that this person was justifiably detained and treated as a result of the common
law duty of necessity and, in addition, as a result of the duty of care professionals owe to
patients in their care. It should be noted that the Court specifically held that the
patriae power of the Court to make decisions in regards to adult persons who are
incapable no longer exists in their jurisdiction. While the ability for hospitds and
physicians to detain and treat voluntary, incapable persons was upheld based on necessity
and deference to physicians acting in their patients' best interests, Lord Steyn expressed
great concem over the Iaw as it exists currently that would provide little, if any,
procedural protections for such patients.
While it appears in England a voluntary, treatment incapable person could be
involuntarily treated, it should be noted that the legislative scheme in Ontario is so
different as to render cornparison of little practical value. For example, Justice Latham
. . Ex P m e Smith
held in the case of B,v.
- ,[1998]
T.N.L.R. No. 362 (Queen's Bench, U.K.) (Q.L.) that the power to detain persons with
menta1 illnesses implied a duty to treat. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the legislation in
Ontario explicitly separates the power to detain fiom the ability to force treatment.
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In this way, the situation of a voluntary, treatment incapable patient who is
resisting treatment and cannot be involuntarily treated would not arise.

A)

Advantages of Advance Directives

a)

Promote and reflect autonomy

As detailed earlier in Chapter 3, autonomy is a principle that is highly respected in
North America. To allow a person to exert her autonomy, in preparation for a time

when this will be impossible (e.g. when incapable), is to give recognition to the
importance this principle has attained in our society. In the context of mental
illness, a capable person, knowing there may be fbture instances where she may
become il1 but not meet the cornmitment criteria, could execute a power of attorney
for persona1 care that authorizes her substitute decision-maker to consent to the use

of force for the purposes of treat~nent.~~'
The use of an advance directive promotes
the autonomy of the person by respecting her wishes, while at the sarne time

enabling treatment to be given, even in the face of subsequent resistance, voiced
while incapable and in the midst of an exacerbation of her disease.

..

Act. 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 50 (2). See Dan W. Brock,
"A Proposal for the Use of Advance Directives in the Treatment of Incompetent Mentally
111 Persons" (1 993) 7:2/3 Bioethics at 25 1..

b)

Reduce (atbeit not eiiminate) the instances of voluntary, treatment
incapable persons who cannot be treated without legal reform that
increase harms (e.g. overbroad reforms discassed earlier)

The use of advance directives would address some situations where voluntary,
incapable persons resist treatment that they would have consented to had they been
capable without requiring massive legislative changes. The proposed legislative
changes could result in potential large inhgements on the liberty of persons with

mental illnesses by broadening the commitment critena or increased abuses or
conflict of interest by substitute decision-makers.

As detailed earlier, it is my belief that broadening the commitment criteria is not an

appropriate response to attempt to address the situation where voluntary, incapable
patients resist treatment and cannot be forcibly treated.'''

While encouraging the

use of advance directives, it is recognized that this proposition will not prevent this
situation f?om o c c u ~ gFor
. instance, some persons will not execute such
documents, other people who d o make use of such instruments will direct their
SDM to refuse treatment, and some persons with mental illnesses may not have
periods of capacity in which to execute such a document. However, the use of
advance directives would provide the needed authority in some cases to detain and
treat a voluntary, incapable patient, without introducing massive legislative

changes that would create separate difficulties.

c)

Eliminates uncertainty

The physician, other members of the health care team, and family members would
be aware that, in the event of treatment resistance by a treatment incapable

voluntary patient, authority nom the individual patient existed to administer such
treatment involuntarily. The substitute decision-maker would know that explicit
instructions had been provided for him to follow in the event such a situation
occurred. Therefore, the use of advance directives, while providing the authority
to restrain for the purposes of treatment an incapable, voluntary person, would also

relieve much of the anxiety that accompanies the uncertainty concerned individuals
face when attempting to provide support for a person with a mental illness.

B)

Disadvantages of Advance Directives

a)

Potential abuse

The authority to have a person restrained for purposes of treatment is a very
serious matter. By executing an advance directive with this power, the grantor is
authorizing infringements on her liberty and bodily integrity.

It should be recognized that pressure might be exerted by family members, health
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care personnel and the substitute decision-maker to execute this type of power of
attorney. This pressure may be subtle and may not be created by improper
motives. For example, as detailed above, the existence of an advance directive,
containing authonzation for restraint for the purposes of treatment alleviates much
of the stress and uncertainty facing those persons most intimately comected with

the patient. They may tmly desire the best for the penon who may have
subsequent p e n d s of incapacity. Nonetheless, such pressure impinges on the
ability of the person to make a voluntary choice regarding executing such a
directive. Other instances could occur where coercion or influence was exerted on
the person to execute an advance directive for improper purposes such as a family
member's vested interest in having the person detained outside the home, or
pressure nom others to accept treatment that one does not agree with.

However, in response to such concems the authorization of such wide powers to
another can (and indeed is) accompanied by strict procedural protection^.'^^ With

..

''The Subatute DeA& 1992,mandates that any advance directive
bestowing such authority on another must be accompanied by the following
procedural protections:
S. 50 (1) Special provisions. --A power of attorney for persona1 care
may contain one or more of the provisions descnbed in subsection
(2), but a provision is not effective unless both of the following
circumstances exist:
1.
At the time the power of attorney was executed or
within 30 days afienvards, the grantor made a
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these protections in place, the use of advance directives could respect the
autonomous decisions of the previously capable individual, and provide certainty
and decreased anxiety for health care professionals, family members, and
substitute decision-makers without running the risk of abuse.

N.
-

duc&on ppd Use of C m n t L-tive

Powers

The legislation in Ontario regarding mental health issues is complex. It is my

2.

statement in the prescribed form indicating that he or
she understood the effect of the provision and of
subsection (4).
Within 30 days after the power of attorney was
executed, an assessor made a statement in the
prescribed form,
hdicating that, after the power of attorney was
i)
executed, the assessor performed an assessment
of the grantor's capacity,
stating the assessor's opinion that, at the time of
ii)
the assessment, the grantor was capable of
personal care and was capable of understanding
the effect of the provision and of subsection (4)'
and
iii)
setting out the facts on which the opinion is
based.

Brock proposes that similar safeguards be put in place for the use of advance
directives by persons with mental illnesses:
must be executed while competent;
a)
a third party must ensure that the patient was competent at the
b)
time;
a third party must ensure that the person was not coerced; and
C)
such instruments could be time-limited.
d)
See Brock,

note 387 at 252.
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position that instead of advocating for change in the mental health legislation,
more education is needed for family, niends, health care providers and legal
personnel. By becoming farniliar with the cunent legislative provisions and
powers, the situation where a treatment incapable, voluntary patient cannot be
involuntarily treated may be reduced.

A)

Family and Friends

..

Under S. 55 of the Substitute Decmns Act. 1992,390 any person may apply to the
Court to be appointed an incapable person's g~ardian.~~'
Therefore, a relative or
&end, concemed about the treatment incapable, voluntary penon's refusal to
comply with treatment could apply to the Court to become his or her guardian. If
sufficient author@ is conferred by the Order of the Court,392a guardian would

have the authority to make decisions regarding not only treatment but restraint for

55 (1) States:
Application for appointment.-The cour? may, on any person's
application, appoint a guardian of the person for a person who in incapable
of personal care and, as a result, nceds decisions to be made on his or her
behalf by a person who is authorized to do so.
It should be noted that S. 57 of the Act sets outs some persons who may not be appointed
guardians.
391~.

392Fullguardianship e(-t
D ..
wS . O . 1992,~.30,s. 59)or
partial guardianship with explicit power regarding restraint (S. 60) may be ordered by the
Court.
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the purposes of treatment in a psychiatric f a ~ i l i t y . Such
~ ~ ) authority would be
suficient to ovemde a treatment incapable, voluntary penon's refisal to comply
with treatment. The education of fiends and family about the provisions in the

mental health legislation regarding guardianship should be encouraged as a
potential avenue of addressing the problem of treatment incapable, voluntary
patients who resist treatment.

B)

Health Care Providers, the Legal Community and Members of the
Consent and Capacity Board

The mental health legislation in Ontario, as in other jurisdictions, is complex and
extensive. While often criticized for its perceived lack of ability to address certain
patient situations, including the inability to involuntarily treat a voluntary,
treatment incapable patient, 1 believe that the law is sufficient, while the
understanding o f it is not.

Many health care providers, lawyen and even some membea of the Consent and
Capacity Board are unfamiliar with the meaning of the law, and therefore, do not

apply the provisions when they could, or apply them inappropriately. In particular,

..

education regarding the guardianship provisions of the Substitute Decisions Act.

..

ecisigns Act. 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 59 (2) (a) and (e).
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1992395and Powers of Attorney for Persona1 care3" is lacking and should be

encouraged. Additionally, health care providen who do not understand the
meaning of the legislation may believe that they can restrain voluntary, treatment
incapable patients who resist treatment, when in actual fact they do not have this

It is because of confusion regarding the meaning of the legislation that many

people, including Dan Newman, a Pariiamentary Assistant to the Minister of
Health, who prepared a review of the mental health system, have stressed the need
for education:

I was told by a number of individuals and groups that Our
govermnent must educate those in the mental health system about the
intent and application of the Act as an initial step before proceeding
with legislative changes. As well, 1 was told that there was an
immediate need for an education and training program for mental
health workers and professionals, including the need for crosssectional education and training.

......................................,.................................................*..........

During my consultations, 1 was told that confusion and
misinterpretation exists within the mental health system and the
broader public regarding the intent and application of the M e d
He& Act and related legislation. Our government has an
oblito ensure that professionals, providers,
consumer/survivors and their families, and the broader public are

394S.0.1992, c. 30, ss. 59 and 60.

ns Act 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30, S. 50.

educated about our provinceys legislation. [emphasis addedI3%

A lack of understanding concerning the powers of the current mental health

legislation should not be used as a justification for proposing changes that could
result in increased liberty inhgements on persons who have been diagnosed as
mentally ill. This has been suggested by some groups, including the Coroner's
Inquest into the death of sportscaster Brian Smith, who was shot by a person with a
mental illness who believed that his thoughts were being broadcast by the media.3g7

The Inquest recornrnended that:
The term 'imminent' should be deleted fiom the Mental Health A c t
sections relating to the criteria for psychiatric assessrnent and
examination, certification of involuntary admission, certificate
renewal and patients' application for renewal.
Rationale: This term is continually misunderstood and misapplied
and implies a time fiame that is too restri~tive.'~'

To suggest that a provision be removed nom an act simply because some persons
do not know what it means, or apply it inappropriately, is not logical. Many

'%DanNewman, "2000 and Beyond: Strengthening Ontario's Mental Health
System (A Report on the Consultative Review of Mental Health Reform in the Province
of Ontario)" June 1998, 12 and 16.
3970ntario,Coroner's Inquest into the Death of Brian Smith (1997 1 1 25)
(Coroner: Dr. B. Bechard) at 3 (hereinaer Coroner's Inquest).
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legislative terms are open to interpretation and removing them for convenience is
not appropriate; nor will such action address the problem of lack of understanding
of the Acts. In addition, such a suggestion centers on the position of the physician
and possibly the public's interest and does not address the potential m e r
infringements on the liberty of individuals with mental illnesses.

Instead of suggesting changes to the current mental health legislation because

some people do not know what powers are contained in the Acts, it would be more
appropriate to address the lack of education that enables such misperceptions to
persist. It is suggested that there is very little effective continuing education for
health care personnel regarding the provisions of the mental health legislation.

While educational opportunities for health care professionals regarding the current
mental health legislation is perceived to be inadequate, so is the training of the
persons who sit on the Consent and Capacity Board. During the Brian Smith
inquest, testimony was presented that revealed that there is no formal education or
training process in place for those persons who are memben of the Consent and
Capacity Board. The Ministry of Health has not provided any funding for the
implementation of such a program but the Chair, Michael Bay, is attempting to
develop a program on his own. The Consent and Capacity Board, charged with
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providing protections for persons involuntarily detained, and deemed incapable to
make treatment de ci si on^,'^^ is not provided with the resources to ensure that al1
members are educated regarding the current status of the law, and that decisions
from diflerent members and/or different regions will be consistent. This should
not be perceived as an incrimination of the Board, but indicates the low pnority the

government places on the appeal process for persons with mental i l l n e s s e ~ ~ ~ ~

As discussed earlier, the number of persons who are voluntary and incapable to

make treatment decisions and cannot be involuntarily treated is, I believe, ~rnall.~*'
Any suggestion that the current mental health legislation should be changed to

'99The Consent and Capacity Board is also the appeal body for other decisions,
including:
capacity to manage one's estate (JidentalHeaIth Act, R.S.O.1990, c. M.7,
a)
S. 60 (1));
capacity
to review or permit disclosure of his or her clinical record
b)
(Mental He& Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7,S. 36 (14);
capacity
to consent to admission to a care faciIity (Jiealth Care Consent
c)
Act- 1996 S . 0 - 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 50 (1)); and
capacity to consent to decisions regarding personal assistance services
d)
(HeaithCare Consent Act. 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A, S. 65 (1)).
4 m ~should
t
also be understood that Michael Bay, the Chair of the Consent and
Capacity Board, is the only full time member, while other members are part-time, and
paid on a fee-for-service basis. While there are nine regional "offices", these "offices"
are "...nothhg more than file drawen in the private offices of our regional vice-chairs
who manage the day-to-day work of the board." Michael Bay works nom his home,
preferring that to the "broom closet" the govemment has assigned him. See Bay, ylpyâ
note 11 at 127.
40'Seepages 119-120.
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ensure that this situation never occurs, absent attempts to provide educational

opportunities to ensure that the law is applied as it should beywould be
inappropriate. Visiting M e r infihgements on persons with mental illnesses
because health c-

professionals, family members, persons in society at large,

lawyee and members of the Consent and Capacity Board do not understand the
law as it currently is drafted, prejudices the interests of those with mental illnesses.

There will always be criticisms regarding the status of the mental health Iegislation

in Ontario. Dissatisfaction will occur as the legislature attempts to balance the
rights of individuals to have their liberty respected and autonomy promoted versus

society's perceived role to provide protections for treatment incapable persons and
put in place systems that ensure that care can be provided for them. The inability

to forcibly treat some voluntary, treatment incapable persons occurs as a result of
the need to balance these competing rïghts. When such a situation occurs it can be

very fhstrating for al1 persons involved. However, to suggest changes that would
ensure that this situation could not occur, such as changing the comrnitment
criteria, increasing the authority of substitute decision-makers, and/or mandating
that al1 voluntary patients be capable of consenting to treatment, could result in

increased infringements on other persons with mental illnesses. For the reasons
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detailed in the preceding pages, 1would not support such changes. In addition, 1
would also not endorse applications to the court to use its

power in

this situation shce the comprehensive legislative scheme conceming guardianship
has essentially ousted that court's authority in this area. Instead, the use of
advance directives should be encouraged, and, perhaps more importantly, efforts to
educate professionals and the public regarding the actual powee and protections
contained in Ontario's mental health legislation should be pursued.

CONCLUSION
While incomprehensible to some, the ability of a voluntary, treatment incapable
patient to veto treatrnent that has been ordered by her physician, and consented to
by a substitute decision-maker on her behalf, should not be viewed as a failure of
the mental health legislation. Instead, it should be viewed as a recognition of the

advances that we, as members of society, through our elected representatives in the
Ontario legislature, have made in our understanding of persons with mental
illnesses. Once believed to be persons to whom society owed no consideration
regarding forced confinement or involuntary treatrnent, Ontario now has in place a
legislative scheme that narrowly defmes who may be deprived of their liberty and
recognizes that consent for treatrnent must be obtained. In the event a person with
a mental illness is not capable of providing such consent, a substitute decisionmaker has been entrusted with that authority. In addition, the current legislation
clearly separates considerations regarding involuntary cornmitment and issues
surrounding treatment.

It is true that health care professionals, families and substitute decision-maken

may find the inability to force al1 voluntary, treatment incapable patients to take
treatment very disturbing. However, amending the legislation so that this situation
could not occur is not an acceptable alternative. Broadening the cornmitment
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cnteria to a type of need for treatment mode1 would potentially i n h g e the liberty
of a large group of persons with mental illnesses. To impose such an infkingement

on many, to potentially enable treatment of a few is not justified and runs the risk
of infiringhg the Charter minimal impairment requirement. In addition, to endorse

such action implies that restraint for the purposes of treatment of involuntary
patients is permissible: it is not clear that this assumption is true. Broadening the
cornmitment criteria also blurs the distinction between cornmitta1 and treatment

and could potentially result in abuses like the past. Additionally, changing the
legislation could result in misplaced decision-making authority: that is, the power
to commit and the power to make substitute decisions could be melded.

Similady, increasing power to the substitute decision-maker is also not an
appropriate response. The power to make treatment decisions on another's behalf
that could infkinge on the patient's bodily integrity is a formidable responsibility.

To add the authority to restrain a person for the purposes of treatment, absent
instructions contained in a POAPC or a guardianship order is placing too much
authority in one person. Such authority could be used to the patient's detriment
and there are no procedural protections in place to ensure abuses do not occur.
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While initially attractive, the suggestion that the legislation be amended to require
that al1 voluntary patients be capable to consent to treatment or admission is also

an inappropriate response. Any such requirement would entwine the issues of
committal and treatment that have been strategically separated since the Mental

Health Act. 1967402and subsequently reinforced by the judiciary403

Although 1 would not support legislative reform in response to the inability to
force treatment on a voluntary, treatment incapable person, the encouragement of
the use of advance directives by persons with mental ilinesses would be supported.

By executing an advance directive while capable , a person with a mental illness
would be making an autonomous choice regarding care during future periods of
incapacity. Thus autonomy could be respected, albeit in an indirect way. A Power
of Attorney for Persona1 Care would also alleviate the stress of family members,
health care personnel, and the substitute decision-maker because of the certainty of

knowing that treatment may be forced if necessary. It must be recognized that
encouraging the use of advance directives will not result in the eradication of
instances where voluntary, treatment incapable persons cannot be treated.
However, the numbers may be reduced, without amending the legislation which

402S.0. 1967, c. 5 1.
O
,3-'

note 65;

m,ylpyp note 308.
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would result in M e r inhgements on the rights of other persons with mental
illnesses.

The current legislation includes a comprehensive scheme for the appointment of

guardians of persons who are incapable of making decisions. It is my belief that
many people, including farnily members and substitute decision-makers of persons
who are incapable of making treatment decisions, are unaware of the provisions of
the legislation in this regard. Education of these groups should be encouraged so

that an application to the court may be made for guardianship. The obtaining of
such an order would eliminate the inability to involuntarily treat some treatment
incapable, voluntary patients.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this thesis is the necessity of
advocating M e r education of health care professionals, the public, members of
the Consent and Capacity Board, lawyers, and patients regarding the current
mental health legislation in Ontario. The law is complex and it has been revised
several times over the past eight years. It is difficult to envision how al1 of these
individuals involved in decision-making do not understand the mechanisms that
are (and are not) available to them. Families and members of the public are
educated through the media regarding mental heath issues, and this information is
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often inaccurate. Funds for the education of members of the Consent and Capacity

Board must be provided. A report., commissioned by the Minister of Health,
Elizabeth Witmer, and presented in June of 1998, stated:

[olur government has an

to ensure that professionals,
providers, consurners/survivors and their families, and the broader
public are educated about our province's l e g i ~ l a t i o n[emphasis
.~~~
added]

It should be remembered, however, that because of the complexity of the law,

some people with genuine concem for persons with mental ilInesses will advocate
reform in order to correct a perceived inadequacy in the legislation that they feel is
detrimental to the voluntary, treatment incapable patient who resists treatment. It
is difficult to envision what such change would do to affect other penons with

mental illnesses, without a thorough understanding of the law in Ontario, as it is
currently drafted, and as it has been interpreted by the judiciary. Sources to assist
with such understanding are not readily available. It is hoped that this thesis can
be used to foster such understanding.

mNewman Report,

note 396 at 16.
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